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I. Introduction:
The literature on retirement behavior has grown rapidly during the last twenty years.
Much of that growth has been due to recent methodological advances in the structural estimation
of dynamic discrete choice models of behavior under uncertainty.  Unlike earlier static lifetime
models (e.g., Fields and Mitchell, 1984), dynamic models account for the sequential nature of the
retirement process in which individuals adjust their behavior as events unfold. Structural
estimation of the fundamental parameters of preferences and constraints as opposed to “reduced
form” analyses permits the simulation of policy experiments that act directly on constraints and
which may be outside of current or prior policy regimes.
Much of the focus in the initial attempts to formulate and estimate a forward looking
model of retirement behavior has been on explaining the empirical regularities of a declining
full-time employment rate with age, with particularly large drops at ages 62 and 65, as well as the
substantial heterogeneity in retirement behavior across individuals (see Gustman and Steinmeier
(1986), Stock and Wise (1990), Berkovec and Stern (1991), Phelan and Rust (1991), Lumsdaine,
Stock and Wise (1992,1994,1995), Rust and Phelan (1997), Blau and Gilleskie (2003,2004)).
Besides establishing the importance of health, wealth and labor market opportunities in
explaining these retirement patterns, these studies also indicate significant roles for capital and
health insurance market imperfections and of social security and private pension rules. 
Social security rules may affect work decisions through the structure of the benefits
schedule, the earnings tax and its actuarially unfair delayed retirement credit associated with
postponing retirement beyond the normal retirement age. Private pensions often include
substantial incentives to remain with a firm until a given age, combined with substantial
incentives to leave the firm at an older age. Therefore, even in an economy with perfect capital
markets where individuals can smooth consumption by borrowing against future pension and
social security income, public and private pensions can produce delays in retirement and spikes
in retirement rates at certain ages. However, their importance for labor supply decisions is likely
to be substantially greater in the presence of borrowing constraints, which may prevent many
low-wage individuals, who optimally accumulate relatively little tangible wealth, from retiring
before reaching the age at which they first become eligible to receive benefits. A similar role can2
be attributed to the Medicare program when health insurance markets are imperfect. Limited
private health insurance options could make it too risky for individuals who don't have access to
employer provided retiree health insurance to retire prior to being eligible for Medicare at 65.
Rust and Phelan (1997) provides empirical evidence of the importance of market
imperfections, attributing a large part of the drop in employment at age 62 to social security
eligibility and at age 65 to Medicare eligibility. Blau and Gilleskie (2003, 2004) also find
significant, although more modest, employment effects of employer provided health insurance.
However, there is an important reason to believe that the roles attributed to social security and
employer provided health insurance in these studies may be overestimated. The models on which
these results are based do not allow households to save, thereby removing an important
instrument through which to smooth consumption (and facilitate early retirement) and to self-
insure against future health expenditures. Gustman and Steinmeier (1986,1994) instead make the
alternative extreme assumption of perfect capital markets, in which individuals can freely borrow
against future earnings and pension income. Given the presence of restrictions on borrowing, this
is likely to lead to an underestimation of the importance of social security and employer linked
health insurance. 
Other empirical studies have found the effect of assets other than social security and
pension annuities on the timing of retirement to be weak (Blau (1994), Diamond and Hausman
(1984), Sickles and Taubman (1986)). However, these studies do not capture completely the
complex interactions that exist between savings, health status, social security benefits, health
insurance coverage and work decisions. Moreover, many of these studies take accumulated
savings or assets to be exogenous in their analysis. Several studies, such as those by Feldstein
(1974) and Bernheim and Levin (1989) have found social security to depress savings, which
suggests that the exogeneity assumption may be incorrect. 
An accurate assessment of the magnitude and manner in which social security benefits
influence behavior is crucial for credibly forecasting the impact of changing the social security
program, a major goal of this paper. We, therefore, develop and estimate a model of retirement
and savings incorporating limited borrowing, stochastic wage offers, health status and survival,
social security benefits, Medicare and employer provided health insurance coverage, andRecent Studies of the effects of similar changes in social security rules have been
1
inconclusive. For example, French (2003) predicts no effect of raising the early retirement age on
simulated work choices at age 62, but Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) forecasts a large increase
in full-time employment at that age.
3
intentional bequests. The model is estimated on sample of relatively poor households from the
first three waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), for whom we would expect social
security income to be of particular importance. The estimated model is used to simulate the
responses to several counterfactual experiments corresponding to changes in social security rules.
These include changes in benefit levels, in the payroll tax, in the social security earnings tax and
in early and normal retirement ages.
1
Our model shares features with many recent papers that have estimated models of
retirement behavior, but is more comprehensive and introduces a number of new elements. It
incorporates savings behavior with limited borrowing as in Gustman and Steinmeier (2002),
French (2003) and French and Jones (2004)), and also models the joint labor supply decision of
married couples as in Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) and Blau and Gilleskie (2004). The
flexibility to augment household income through spousal work is potentially an important
instrument to insure against wage and health shocks, as well as a tool for smoothing
consumption. We explicitly incorporate the social security benefit rules which apply to couples,
allow for health insurance coverage through the spouse and incorporate the possibility of direct
preferences for shared leisure and of assortative mating on preferences and on health and market
skill endowments.
Wages in our model are stochastic as in French (2003), but also depends on accumulated
work experience and tenure and we allow individuals to change jobs which may or may not offer
health insurance. Like Berkovec and Stern (1991), in characterizing employment choices we
distinguish between part-time and full-time work, model job-to-job transitions and instead of
treating retirement as an absorbing state, allow returns from non-employment into the labor
force. However, we do not explicitly consider the purchase of private health insurance and
medical expenditure decisions (Blau and Gilleskie, 2003), private pensions on current jobs
(Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise 1992,1994,1995,  French 2003, Blau and Gilleskie, 2003) nor do
we model disability insurance applications and benefit receipt (Rust et al, 2003).4
Our model accommodates observed and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, wages,
health transitions and mortality risks. In addition, individuals in our model have expectations
over changes in social security policy.  Myopic beliefs about the social security system may be
unrealistic given the long history of changes in the social security rules and benefit levels which
have been enacted over the 1969-90 period, with major changes in 1972, 1977 and 1983. As
Moffitt (1987) has argued, the magnitude of behavioral responses to policy changes will depend
strongly on the extent to which these policy changes were anticipated. In an analysis of data from
the Survey of Economic Expectations on subjective expectations of future social benefit receipt,
Dominitz, Manski and Heinz (2003) in fact conclude that a sizeable proportion of their sample,
and especially among the young, consider it fairly likely that the social security program will no
longer exist at the time they retire. 
A final contribution of this paper is that we make explicit use of subjective expectations
in the estimation of our model. The Health and Retirement Study contains a set of probabilistic
questions, on, among others, retirement and longevity expectations. For example, all those
employed in 1992 were asked for their subjective probability that they would be working full-
time after reaching ages 62 and 65, and all respondents were asked about their probabilities of
surviving to age 75 and 85. Reported expectations about future choices have precise
interpretations within the context of dynamic behavioral models. Just as current choices are taken
to portray optimal behavior given current information, expectations about future choices portray
optimal future behavior conditional on current information. As a result, subjective data provide
useful information about the decision process in the same way as does objective data (van der
Klaauw (2000), Wolpin (1999)). 
We highlight a few of the results of the counterfactual policy changes. For example, for
married couples, we find that a 25 percent reduction in social security benefits would lead to a
small decline in the labor supply of both spouses at ages between 51 and 61, and a substantial
increase, particularly for husbands, at ages between 62 and 69; the full-time employment rate of
husbands in this latter age range is predicted by the model to increase from 37.8 to 45.2 percent.
Although average annual earnings thus increases in the latter age range and average net assets
optimally falls, average annual household consumption falls over the 62-69 age range by 4.05
percent because of the reduction in benefits. Eliminating the earnings tax is predicted to have a
substantial impact on labor supply. For example, between ages 62 and 69 the average annual
hours worked of single males is predicted to increase from 543 to 814 and that of single females
from 737 to 950. Concomitantly, average net assets over that range would increase from 31,842
to 38,995 for the males and from 38,133 to 45,781 for the females. Finally, eliminating the
option of early retirement also significantly increases labor supply - over the 62 to 69 age range,
the average annual hours supplied by married couples increases from 1219 to 1459, that supplied
by single males from 543 to 830 and by single females from 737 to 896.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in the next
section and the solution method used to solve the model in section 3. Section 4 describes the
HRS data. The econometric specification and estimation method are discussed in section 5. The 
auxiliary statistical model used for the indirect inference estimation procedure is presented in
section 6 and details about the simulation methodology used to implement the procedure are
provided in section 7. Estimation results and model fit are discussed in the following section and
counterfactual experiments in section 9. A brief conclusion is presented in section 10.
II. Model
The model represents the decision problem of an individual of given gender or a married
couple. The optimization problem, consistent with the data available for estimation, begins at a
point in the middle of the household’s life cycle. Initial conditions are those that prevail at that
life cycle point; variation among agents in initial conditions are not explicitly considered until the
model’s solution and estimation method are discussed.   
A. Choice Set: 
An unmarried individual of gender j (j = m, f) at each discrete age a chooses
consumption,  , and hours worked in the labor market,  . Hours worked, if positive, is
allowed to take on only two values, part-time hours   and full-time hours  . In
addition, the employment decision is constrained by whether or not the individual worked in the
previous period; an individual who was working at age a-1 may choose not to work at age a, to
work at age a in the old firm,  , or to work in a new firm,  . An individual who did not work
in the previous period must work, if at all, in a new firm. Employment choices are further In the application, A*=90 and A=75.
2
 There are five possible hours combinations in the first case, given that working in a new
3
firm and in an old firm are mutually exclusive alternatives, and three in the second. 
 Exact functional forms are presented below.
4
 We do not allow for divorce.
5
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restricted in that all individuals are assumed to stop working (permanently) at age A.
Consumption decisions are made until A*.   Thus, the choice set at age a<A for an individual
2
who worked in the previous period consists of all feasible combinations of  ; for an
individual who did not work in the previous period the choice set consists of the feasible
combinations of   .  The choice set at age a is denoted by  and a specific choice within
3
that set by  . A married couple chooses the consumption and hours of work of each; the choice
set is given by  and any choice element within the set by  . Households, singles
or couples, are assumed to be able to borrow and lend and thus may smooth consumption over
the life cycle, although net borrowing is restricted (see below). Net assets carried over from a (to
a+1),  , is determined residually from the consumption and labor force status decision at a.
Consumption, and thus net assets, is treated as continuous.
B. Preferences:
Each individual of gender j is assumed to have a well-defined preference function over
own consumption and labor force status, namely   where M is
an indicator of marital status, Z is an indicator of health, and the   are age-varying shocks to
the marginal utility of consumption and hours worked.  The marriage decision is not explicitly
4
modeled. The decision model is assumed to pertain only to ages at and beyond some age  ,
from which time it is assumed that an unmarried individual will forever remain single. A married




An individual who is single at some age a,  , having been single up to age a or having
been previously married but currently widowed, maximizes the expected present discounted
value of remaining lifetime utility. The time of death is uncertain, although there is a known
finite maximum length of life, a = A. Individuals are assumed also to obtain utility from At ages prior to A-1, the bequest is multiplied by the probability of not surviving to the
6
next period. At all ages, the bequest is not discounted because, as noted, utility is received during
the last period of life.
7
bequests. The utility obtained from making a bequest if the individual were to die at age a is
. As the notation indicates, although the bequest actually occurs at a, the utility
associated with the bequest is derived while the individual is still alive, at a-1 .
In the last potential decision period, at age A-1, the individual’s total utility is therefore
.  Given the state space at A-1,  (see below), the individual chooses the level of
6
consumption, and thus net assets carried forward, and labor force status that maximizes this
terminal period total utility, i.e.,  . Thus, the maximized value of each of the
two components of total utility at A-1 can be written as a function of the state space. We denote
the maximized value of the first component of utility by   and that of the second
(bequest) component as  . 
At any age a, the maximized expected present value of remaining total lifetime utility
given the state space at a, denoted by  , is the sum of the maximized expected present
values of the remaining utility associated with the two components,  and  . Each of
these components satisfy a Bellman equation, as does their sum. Specifically,
where  is the one-period survival rate (from a to a+1) for a person of gender j and   is the
discount factor. 
2. Married couples:
In considering the objective function of married couples, to avoid notational complexity, In (3), the mortality hazards of the husband and wife are assumed independent. Later,
7
we allow them to be correlated through assortative mating on unobservables.  
8
assume that the husband and wife are of the same age. Then, if each is alive at age A-1, the
couple chooses consumption levels and hours of work of each to maximize a weighted average of
the individual expected values of the remaining lifetime utilities. Specifically, letting   be the
weight placed on the husband’s utility,  
where  denotes the state space for a couple, i.e, the Cartesian product of the individual state
spaces. Note that the weight in any period, as written, is time-varying as a function of the current
period state space. 
In decision periods prior to A-1, the couple takes into account the possibility that either or
both may not survive into future periods. The expected present discounted value of the couple’s 
remaining lifetime utility is given by
 
where the argument,  , has been suppressed in   and in  for convenience.  The value
7
function in (3) is the sum of (i) the share-weighted average of the current individual utilities; (ii)
the probability that they both survive times the couple’s expected remaining lifetime utility one-
period ahead; (iii) the probability that neither the husband nor the wife survives beyond the
period times the share-weighted average of their individual utilities from a bequest; (iv) the Allowing for pension accrual on a current job with a defined benefit plan or savings
8
associated with a defined contribution plan introduces significant complications in the solution
and estimation of the model. As discussed below, we restrict our sample to be consistent with the
model.  
9
probability that the wife survives beyond the period but the husband does not multiplied by the
sum of the husband’s share times his expected utility of the bequest that the wife will make upon
her death (which depends on her future savings decisions) and the wife’s share times her
expected remaining lifetime utility as a single individual; and (v) the probability that the husband
survives beyond the period but the wife does not multiplied by the sum of the wife’s share times
her expected utility of the bequest that the husband will make upon his death (which depends on
his future savings decisions) and the husband’s share times his expected remaining lifetime
utility as a single individual.
If the husband and wife are of different ages, the Bellman equations are combinations of
(1) and (3). Specifically, if the age difference is k periods, then from the younger spouse’s age A-
k to age A-1, the value function will be that of a single person as in (1). At the younger spouse’s
age A-k-1, when the older spouse is age A-1, the value function for the couple will be given by
(3) with the survival probability of the older spouse set to zero. In periods prior to the previous
one, the value function is given exactly by (3). 
C. Budget Constraint:
Define   to be the amount of labor market earnings at age a of an individual of gender j
and   the amount of non-earned income. Labor market earnings is the product of the hourly
wage,  , and hours worked. Net earnings,  , is labor market earnings net of the payroll tax
and the income tax. The payroll tax rate is  (=7.65% in 1992) and is applied to earnings up to a
maximum of  (=$55,500 in 1992). Non-labor income at age a is the sum of interest income
(payments) on net assets carried over from the previous period,  , where r is the fixed
(borrowing and lending) rate of interest and retirement income from social security, , and from
a private defined benefit pension on a previous job,  .   Labor earnings, interest income and
8
pension income are also to be taxed at a constant marginal rate, (=15%). In addition to a
homogenous consumption good, the budget constraint also incorporates expenditures that arise
from poor health. Specifically, an individual in poor health at age a ,  , pays a cost of   if An individual or couple for whom minimum consumption is not feasible, according to
9
the above criterion, is relieved of the interest payment in that period as well as that part of the
debt necessary to meet next period’s borrowing constraint.
10
the individual is not covered by health insurance; an individual in poor health who is covered by
health insurance at age a ( >0) is assumed to have no out-of-pocket expenses as is a person in
good health,  . Thus, the budget constraint for a single individual of gender j is 
where  is an indicator function equal to unity if the expression inside the parentheses is true
and zero otherwise. Similarly, the budget constraint for a married couple is
Notice that in (5), if either spouse has employer provided health insurance, the household is
assumed to be covered. The individual or couple also faces a borrowing constraint, namely that
, where the lower bound on net assets is a function of age and may be negative.
There is also assumed to exist a publicly (or otherwise) provided guaranteed minimum level of
consumption,   , for a single individual and twice that for a couple. An individual or couple
becomes eligible for the transfer if minimum consumption is not feasible after paying off the
interest on the debt and enough of the principal to meet the following period’s net borrowing
constraint.     
9
D. Wage Offers:
Wage offers are the product of a skill rental price,  , and an individual’s stock of human
capital, K. An individual accumulates human capital through general work experience and work
experience specific to a job (tenure). The rental price of human capital has a firm-specific The index used to calculate the AIME is based on the national average of total wages.
10
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component,  , that is constant over tenure within the firm and also differs between part- and
full-time employment. The wage offered to an individual is thus 
where E is years of schooling (assumed fixed at the initial age),   is cumulative hours worked
up to age a,   is tenure as measured by the cumulative hours worked for the current employer
up to age a and  is a random shock to an individual’s human capital at age a. As already noted,
an individual who is working at a-1 receives a wage offer from the same firm as well as an offer
from a new firm. The wage offer from the new firm differs from that of the old firm in that tenure
is zero at the new firm  , there is a new firm-specific component to the rental price for the
individual’s human capital stock  and a different human capital shock ( ).
E. Social Security Income:
Individuals generally become eligible to apply for social security at age 62. To be eligible
for benefits at that age on the basis of one’s own employment history requires that the individual
has accumulated 40 quarters of covered earnings. In 1992, an individual accumulated one quarter
for each $570 of annual earnings (up to a maximum of 4 quarters). Benefits (the primary
insurance amount or PIA), given eligibility, depend on an individual’s average indexed monthly
earnings (AIME) calculated on an annual basis.  In calculating this average, there is a maximum
10
amount for covered monthly earnings within a year, $4,625 in 1992 ($55,500 annual earnings as
is the maximum taxable earnings,  ), and the lowest five years of indexed earnings are
dropped. Given that we observe an individual’s AIME only in the middle of the life cycle, in
order to avoid having to keep track of the entire history of earnings in updating the AIME from
that first observation, it is assumed that the lowest five years of earnings that have already
occurred will remain the lowest. The number of computation years that is used to calculate the
AIME is the number of years since turning age 21. Thus, letting  be the AIME at age a, the
AIME is updated as follows:   We do not model the decision to apply for social security. Instead, it is assumed that all
11
individuals accept social security in the first year in which their benefit net of the earnings tax
exceeds 25% of the benefit they would receive if they had zero earnings. Thus, an individual who
would receive a social security benefit at age 62 of at least that amount is treated as if the
individual had applied for social security at age 62. If the net benefit is less than this amount at
age 62, then the benefits obtainable at age 63 are augmented to reflect the actuarial fair
adjustment. A similar procedure is followed for all subsequent ages. 
 In 1992, the values of the parameters determining benefits were as follows:
12
and The  latter
set of parameters are referred to as bend points. 
 If benefits are collected prior to age 65, the reduction in benefits continues past age 65,
13
although it is recalculated at age 65 to account for months in which net benefits were zero. We
12
where all earnings figures are divided by 12 to reflect the monthly basis of the AIME.  
11
Social security benefits are a piece-wise linear function of AIME. Specifically, gross
benefits are determined by
 
Gross benefits are zero if the number of accumulated covered quarters at age 62 is less than 40,
.  Earnings above a minimum amount,   (= $7440 annually, $620 monthly in 1992), are
12
taxed at a 50% rate, so potential net benefits at age 62 are
Gross benefits increase by 6.67% up to age 65 for each year that the age of first receipt of
benefits is postponed.  After age 65, gross benefits are increased by a variable amount ranging
13ignore this recalculation in the model and its associated incentive effects (see Benitez-Silva and
Heiland, 2004).
 An individual reaching age 62 in 1993 or 1994 receives an adjustment to gross benefits
14
of 5%, with the adjustment increasing by.5% for each additional two years up to 8% for
individuals reaching age 62 on or after 2005. In the model, we assume a 5.0% rate for all birth
cohorts.
 The earnings tax has recently been eliminated for ages 66 to 69.
15
 We assume that the recent change in the earnings test reducing the exemption age to 66
16
was unanticipated. 
 In the case of a widow(er), if the one change that is permitted in the model has not
17
occurred prior to the spouses’s death and the widow(er) is under the age of 62, then the
widow(er)’s expectation would be in force until reaching age 62.
13
from 5% to 8% depending on the calendar year in which the individual reaches age 62.  In
14
addition, the earnings tax is reduced to 33.3% at age 65 and to zero at age70, and the minimum
monthly earnings not subject to tax between age 65 and 69 increases to $850.  
15
Married individuals may elect to collect benefits based upon either their own AIME or
that of their spouse who is retired. At age 62, the gross benefits available using the spouse’s
AIME is 37.5% of the spouse’s gross benefits. If the age of first receipt is postponed to 63, gross
benefits are 41.7% of the spouse’s gross benefits, if postponed to 64, 45.8%, and if postponed to
65 or later, 50%. 
Widowed individuals can collect on their spouse’s earnings record at age 60. At age 60,
gross benefits are 71.5% of their spouse’s gross benefits and at age 61, 77.2%, and at ages 62
through 65, 82.9%, 88.6%, 94.3%, and 100%. At any time after reaching age 62, a widow(er)
may elect to switch to the gross benefits based on their own earnings record.
Given the forward-looking nature of the model, it is necessary to make an assumption
about what individuals forecast about future social security rules. We model this uncertainty as a
discrete probability distribution over a fixed number of possible proportionate changes in
benefits, i.e.,  proportionate changes in the parameters of the piece-wise linear components, the
, of the social security rule (8).  Specifically, for any given AIME, benefits are forecasted to
16
change proportionately by  0, 25, or 50% with given probabilities. We allow only one change to
be forecasted by the individual up to age 62 which will be in place from then on. For a couple,
the one change would have to occur by age 62 for the older spouse.  
17
F. Mortality Risk: As reflected in (5) and (11), we assume that the spouse of an individual with coverage
18
is also covered. 
14
Mortality is exogenous in the model, although the risk of mortality at any given age
depends on an individual’s state of health, sex and age. Specifically, the probability that the
individual survives to age a+1 given survival to age a, the survival hazard, is 
for j=m, f. 
G. Health:
An individual’s state of health is assumed to affect utility directly as in (1) and mortality
risk as in (10). As noted, health is assumed to be either good,  , or poor,  . The
probability of being in good health at a + 1 is assumed to depend on age, health at age a, and on
whether the individual is covered by health insurance, namely
The range of health insurance options is defined next.
H. Health Insurance:
An individual can be covered by health insurance either through a job if one works,
through a prior job that provides health insurance upon retirement, or automatically through
Medicare upon reaching age 65. We do not allow for the purchase of private health insurance nor
do we distinguish between employer-provided insurance vs. Medicare in it’s effect on health.
Specifically, health insurance coverage at age a (<65) is categorized as follows:  if the
individual currently works or worked in the past for an employer who provide coverage that
continues after retiring from the firm;   if the individual is covered by the employer who
doesn’t provide coverage after retiring from the firm; and   if the individual has no
coverage.
18
While at a particular firm, coverage, or lack of it, is assumed to continue without15
alteration until age 65 at which time Medicare coverage is substituted. We assume that new jobs
do not provide coverage upon retirement, i.e.,  . A new employer may offer health
insurance either only for full-time work or for both full- or part-time work. The probability that a
new employer offers health insurance in either case is assumed to depend on the firm-specific
component in the wage offer function, namely
Conditional on receiving an offer from a firm that offers health insurance, the probability that the
firm requires full-time work in the first year of employment to receive it is given by  . 
III. Solution Method
The model is numerically solved by backwards recursion. However, because the state
space consists of elements that are continuous variables, e.g., the current level of household
assets, the current level(s) of the AIME, it is not possible to obtain “exact” solutions. Instead, we
adopt an approximation method due to Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997). The details of the
solution procedure are provided for single individuals. The procedure for married couples differs
only in the number of alternatives available to the household and in the size of the state space.
At age A-1, a single individual decides on consumption and employment status to
maximize terminal total utility,  , where the state space,  , is divided into a
“deterministic” component containing the elements that are not random at the beginning of A-1,
, and a “shock” component containing the vector of random (preference, human capital,
health, mortality and health insurance coverage) shocks drawn at A-1,  , inclusive of the job-
specific component of the new wage offer,  . For any given value of the deterministic and shock
components of the state space, optimal consumption is obtained by solving the Euler equation,
allowing for one corner solution at the lower bound for net assets (implying a maximum level of
consumption) and another at the minimum consumption level, for each of the three possible
choices of employment status. The employment status and associated optimal consumption that
maximizes total utility is chosen for that value of the state space. At any deterministic state point,
the expected value of maximum terminal utility is obtained by Monte Carlo integration, that is, The approximation uses a spline function to capture the effect of the minimum
19
consumption floor. After extensive experimentation, we found a piecewise quadratic
specification with estimable nodes to be the best fitting. We used 20 draws for the Monte Carlo
integration and 2000 state points for the approximation.   
16
by taking draws from the (joint) shock vector distribution and averaging to obtain  .
This expectation is calculated at a subset of the deterministic state points and the function is
approximated for all other state points by a polynomial regression.  We denote this function as
19
Emax(A-1).   
This procedure is repeated at age A-2. Using (1), substituting the Emax(A-1) function for
the future component of the value function at A-2, the Euler equation is solved for optimal
consumption at all possible employment statuses for a given value of the state space at A-2,
yielding the optimal decision. Monte Carlo integration over the shock vector at A-2 provides 
for a given deterministic state point. A polynomial regression over a subset of the
state points provides an approximation to the function, denoted by Emax(A-2). Repeating the
procedure back to the initial age provides the Emax polynomial approximation at each age. The
set of Emax(a) functions fully describe the solution to the optimization problem.
In the model described by (1) - (13), the state space for an unmarried (not widowed)
individual of age a and gender j includes, in addition to a and j, net assets ( ), health status
( ) and health insurance status ( ), work experience (  ), job tenure ( ) and the job-
specific wage component of the previous period’s job ( ), the AIME ( ), the number
of covered quarters of social security (  ), whether the individual ever collected social security
and if so the age at which benefit receipt began, whether a change in social security benefit rules
has occurred and its magnitude, whether the individual retired from a pension job and is age-
eligible to collect and if so, the amount currently collected ( ) and if not, the age at which the
individual will be eligible to collect, and education (E). For a widow(er), the state space also
includes the deceased spouse’s AIME and the age at which the widow(er) is eligible to collect,
and the deceased spouse’s pension accrual and the age the spouse is eligible to collect. For
married couples, all of the individual-specific components plus household net assets comprise the
state space. 
IV. Data The reason for this restriction is that the HRS did not collect social security records for
20
spouses of those who are widowed or divorced. We adopt the implicit assumption that women
who are widowed or divorced prior to age 45 will collect social security on their own earnings
records. 
 Allowing for savings from defined contributions plans would require adding another
21
decision variable to the model given their tax-deferred treatment. 
 Defined benefit plans are very heterogeneous with respect to their accrual rates and
22
retirement age provisions. To incorporate DB plans would require essentially that the model be
solved for each individual in the sample with a different plan.  
  We also restricted the sample to couples where the spouse of the HRS respondent was
23
not less than 45 years old at the wave1 interview.
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The data come from the first three waves of the Health and Retirement Study (Juster and
Suzman, 1995). The target population for the HRS in the 1992 first wave included all non-
institutionalized adults living in a household within the contiguous U.S. born in the years 1931-
1941. Spouses of age-eligible individuals residing within the household are also HRS
respondents. The HRS includes a representative core sample and oversamples of blacks,
Hispanics and Florida residents. A total of 12,652 individuals residing in 7,608 households were
interviewed in 1992. The same households are re-interviewed every two years. A total of 11,596
individuals in 7,227 households were interviewed in 1994 and 10,964 individuals in 6,816
households in 1996. 
The sample used in the analysis is restricted as follows:
1. Among those who were unmarried at wave1, those who were married by wave 2 or wave 3
were eliminated. Those women who were unmarried at wave 1 and widowed or divorced after
age 44 were eliminated.  Among those who were married at wave 1, both household members
20
were eliminated if the couple was divorced by wave 2 or wave 3. 
2. We eliminated all individuals who were ever self-employed (through wave 3); in the case of
married couples, both members were eliminated if either was ever self-employed. 
3. We eliminated all individuals who ever had defined contribution (DC) pensions; in the case of
married couples, both were eliminated if either had a DC plan.
21
4. We eliminated individuals who are currently working on a job with a DB pension and couples
for whom that is the case for either.
22
The estimation sample contains 230 single males, 363 single females, and 525 couples.
23 The weighted figures use the household weights supplied by the HRS. The weighted
24
sample is representative of the population of households in 1992 for which at least one adult
comes from the sampled birth cohorts.  
  Using person weights, that is, giving positive weight only to those in the sampled birth
25
cohorts, the weighted mean ages for married males and females, as they should be, are very close
to those of their unmarried counterparts. 
 Among those actually collecting a pension, i.e., excluding those who never had a
26
pension and those who are not yet collecting, the average for that same group is almost $12,000.
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Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the state variables at the initial wave for the estimation
sample separately by gender and marital status. Single males and females in the HRS must come
from the sampled birth cohorts; married males and females may be spouses of HRS respondents
outside of the sample birth cohorts. The first number in each cell is the unweighted statistic
(mean, percent), the number below in parentheses is the standard deviation and the number
below that is the weighted statistic.  Single respondents are on average around 56 years of age
24
(weighted and unweighted). Because husbands tend to be older than their wives, and thus more
likely to have been born before 1931, the average age of the married males in the sample is 59
and that of the married females, 55 (weighted and unweighted).  
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As noted, blacks and Hispanics are oversampled in the HRS. The restrictions imposed in
obtaining the estimation sample further skews the sample towards minorities, e.g., in the
unweighted initial sample, 38 percent of single males and 19 percent of married males are black
as opposed to 23 and 12 percent in the weighted estimation sample. Similarly, average completed
schooling in the unweighted estimation sample is generally lower than for the weighted sample
by as little as .3 years for single males and as much as  .6 years for married males. Although the
estimation sample does not contain individuals currently working in a job with a defined benefit
pension, a significant proportion of the sample have previously held a job with a defined benefit
plan (ranging from 17 percent for single females to 50 percent for married males). The average
pension income being collected by married couples is  $4,000.
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The HRS collected a partial work history at the first interview. This included information
about the beginning date of the current job, the beginning and ending date of the last job if not
currently working, and the beginning and ending dates of jobs held more than five years.
Respondents supplied information about hours worked and wages for those jobs. In addition, in Bracketed responses are included in the imputed category. These asset values do not
27
contain an imputed value for social security “wealth” nor is it necessary to do so in defining the
relevant state variable for the optimization problem.
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wave 3 (1996), information was collected about the number of years worked six months or more
and the number of those years consisting of full-time work. We used all of this information to
calculate a measure of work experience at the time of the first survey. Specifically, we estimated
the number of years the individual worked part- and full-time since the first year the individual
worked at least six months. Total hours worked up to the initial interview is the number of  part-
time years times 1040 plus the number of full-time years times 2080. As seen in table 1, average
work experience in the estimation sample ranges from about 32,000 hours for married females to
73,000 for married males. Single females had worked approximately 10,000 more hours than
married females and single males about 15,000 hours less than married males.
Current job tenure follows a similar pattern, although the current tenure of single females
exceeds that of single males. The fact that about 80 percent of the single females in the sample
were previously married, albeit prior to age 45, and during that time accrued less work
experience, could account for their smaller work experience but slightly greater current tenure.
Married males have current tenure of almost 14,000 hours and married females of around 8,000
hours.
The HRS collects detailed information on asset holdings at each wave. Table 1 reports
statistics on total net assets at the first wave based on complete reports by respondents on all of
the components of net assets and, separately, on total net assets that contains values imputed by
the HRS for the components that are missing.  Regardless of which measure is used, total net
27
assets of single males exceeds that of single females and both are considerably less than the total
net assets of married couples. For singles, the measure of mean assets that uses imputed values is
about 50 percent higher for males and almost double for females than that of the measure without
imputations. However, for married couples, the two measures of mean assets are close. Median
net assets are considerably smaller than mean assets reflecting right skewness in the net asset
distribution and, unlike for the mean, the median with imputations is about 50 percent higher
than without imputations for married couples.  
The number of quarters of covered earnings follows a pattern similar to work experience. In 27 percent of the married couples, at least one spouse had employer-provided health
28
insurance. 
 For earlier analyses of these expectations data see Honig (1996,1998).
29
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Married males have on average the most covered quarters (108) followed by single males (93),
single females (62) and married females (55). Commensurately, average indexed monthly
earnings (AIME) is $1,276 for married males, $931 for single males, $499 for single females and
$390 for married females. 
Around 50 percent of single males and females report that their health is either fair or
poor (what will be called “poor” health), while fair or poor health is reported by only about a
third of married males or females. Among singles, 17 percent of the males and 21 percent of the
females have employer-provided health insurance, while for married individuals the comparable
rates are 18 percent for males and 11 percent for females.  Only about 10 percent of individuals
28
in the sample would have employer-provided health insurance available when retired, although
that figure ranges from 6 to 12 percent across the groups.   
Although not state variables of the model, the table also reports on responses in the first
wave to several subjective expectations questions, asked of HRS respondents, that we make use
of in estimation: the percent chance that the respondent will be working full-time after reaching
age 62, the percent chance that the respondent will survive to age 75, and the percent chance that
the respondent (or couple) will leave a bequest of $10,000 or more, and separately, $100,000 or
more. According to these data, married males believe themselves slightly more likely to be
working full-time after age 62 than single males, while (mean) percent chance of working full-
time after 62 is 11 percentage points higher for single than for married females.  Married males
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believe they are more likely to be alive at age 75 and 85 than singles, while there are only small
differences between the beliefs of married and single females. Married individuals see
themselves as more likely to leave a bequest of either 10,000 or 100,000 dollars. Expected social
security benefits upon retirement are about the same for single males and females, although the
current AIME is significantly larger for males, largest for married males and smallest for married
females.    
At each subsequent bi-annual interview, a fairly comprehensive job event history back to
the previous interview is collected that includes beginning and ending dates of employer-specific21
job spells, and weekly hours worked and hourly wage rates at those dates. We used the data to
create a monthly record of employment, weekly hours worked and hourly wages. Weekly hours
worked within an employer spell is the average of the beginning and ending hours. The hourly
wage during the employer spell is the weekly-hours weighted average of the hourly wage at those
two points. Annual employment rates are calculated beginning at the month of the first interview
and based on cumulating hours worked over each consecutive 12-month period; part-time
employment in a year is defined as having worked between 500 and 1499 hours over the 12
months, full-time employment as having worked 1500 or more hours with non-employment the
residual category. The hourly wage over the 12-month period is the average earnings over the
period, the sum of earnings over employer spells in the 12-month period divided by total hours
worked. Earnings over the period is the hourly wage times 1,040 if the individual worked part-
time and 2,080 if full-time over the period.
We organized the data so that a decision period corresponds to a 12-month period. The
first period observation is the 12-month period starting from the month of the first-wave
interview, with each period corresponding to the subsequent 12 months. An individual’s age in
years over each 12-month period is the modal age in the period. Similarly, the calendar year is
the modal year represented in a 12-month period. Households are observed for from one to five
12-month periods depending on the number and timing of the interviews in which they
participated. Approximately 85 percent of the households are observed for at least four 12-month
periods, with less than 3 percent observed for 5 periods. Overall, there are 6,363 person-periods
(4,313 household periods).  
V. Estimation Method
The model represents the decision process of one household. Differences in the behavior
of households with the same initial state variables arise solely due to iid shocks to preferences,
shocks to health and health insurance coverage if changing jobs, and shocks to wages
(conditional on the employer-specific unobservable for those who are working). However,
behaviors tend to be more persistent than can be captured by observable state variables. We,
therefore, allow for households to differ in some permanent features that are unobserved by us.
Specifically, there are assumed to be a fixed number of types of people who differ parametrically This treatment of unobserved heterogeneity follows that of Heckman and Singer (1984)
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and has been implemented in DP models (see, for examples, Wolpin (1984), van der Klaauw
(1996), Keane and Wolpin (1997, 2001) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1999)).
 Keane and Wolpin (2001) develop a  likelihood simulation-based method of estimation
31
when state variables are missing that circumvents having to perform that integration. The overall
complexity of our model and data makes that method burdensome to implement.
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in aspects of preferences and constraints.  We provide the exact functional forms when we
30
discuss the parameter estimates of the model.
There are two problems that arise in estimating the behavioral model. First, we observe
decisions beginning only in the middle of the life cycle that are, thus, conditioned on state
variables that arise from prior decisions. To the extent that those “initial” conditions are not
exogenous, e.g., if there is unobserved heterogeneity in preferences or constraints, direct
estimation will lead to bias. Second, a substantial number of observations in our sample are
missing information necessary to calculate some of the initial state variables and some of the
state variables are available only every other year. In particular, initial work experience could not
be calculated for 32 percent of the males and 24 percent of the females and current job tenure for
about 14 percent of males and 26 percent of females. In addition, at the first interview, total net
assets (non-imputed) is missing for 50 percent, AIME for 30 percent and the number of covered
quarters for about 24 percent of the sample.
To account for the “initial” conditions problem, we assume that the probabilities of the
unobserved heterogeneity types can be represented by parametric functions of  the initial state
variables. With shocks to preferences, wages, etc., that are serially independent, the initial state
variables are exogenous given type. In the case where observations are missing state variables,
calculating choice probabilities (as would enter a likelihood function) would require integrating
over the  distribution of the missing state variables.  To avoid that computational burden, we
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pursue a non-likelihood-based estimation strategy, indirect inference (see Gourieroux et al
(1993), Gallant and Tauchen (1996), and Gourieroux and Monfort (1996)). The basic idea is to
fit simulated data obtained from the behavioral model to an “auxiliary” statistical model that can
be easily estimated and that provides a complete enough statistical description of the data to be
able to identify the parameters of the behavioral model. 
More specifically, suppose we estimate a set of  auxiliary statistical relationships with See Gourieroux and Monfort (1996) for proofs of these propositions.
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parameters   . At the ML estimate,  ,  the score of the likelihood function (L) with respect to
the actual data ( ) must be zero, i.e.,  .  Denoting  as the parameters of the
behavioral model, the idea is to choose parameters that generate simulated data ( ) that makes
the score function as close to zero as possible. This is accomplished by minimizing the weighted
squared deviations of the score function evaluated at the simulated data; thus the structural
parameters are chosen such that  
The optimal weighting matrix,  , is the inverse of the Hessian evaluated at the actual data. The
estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal when the number of simulated observations
grows proportionately with the number of actual observations as the latter goes to infinity.
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The auxiliary model that we use in estimation consists of a combination of “approximate”
decision rules (that govern the choice variables) and modified  structural relationships (such as
the health transition function). Obviously, the choice of the auxiliary model is crucial for
identification. It is, however, not possible to make a purely constructive identification argument. 
VI. The Auxiliary Statistical Model
The solution of the optimization problem of section II is a set of decision rules in which
an optimal choice made at any age a (of a single individual or of the younger spouse) is a
function of the state space at age a. As discussed above, all of the state variables at any age a
enter into the decision rule that governs the choice at age a. To motivate one class of the auxiliary
models, what we would call “approximate” decision rules, let  if alternative k is chosen at
age a and zero otherwise,   be the expected discounted value of lifetime utility if
alternative k is chosen (the alternative-specific value function), where    is the state space that
is relevant to alternative k, and  the maximum of the alternative-specific value functions
excluding that of alternative k.  Decision rules take the form:
33 See Keane and Wolpin (2000) for a more complete discussion of the formulation of
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approximate decision rules and for an application. 
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Note that the decision rules depend on the entire state space,  , although individual value
functions do not, and that the state space contains elements that are random from the researcher’s
perspective, e.g., preference shocks. Given the state variables that enter the model, to estimate
approximate decision rules parametrically, then, requires choosing a function F and distributional
assumptions for the shocks.   
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When the choice set and/or the state space is large, approximate decision rules tend not to
have parsimonious representations. The number of parameters to be estimated in any multinomial
discrete choice statistical model will be at least equal to the number of state variables times the
number of alternatives (less one).  Recall that for an individual who did not work in the previous
period, the choice set consists of consumption (or net assets) and 3 possible employment states
(work full-time, work part-time or not work). For an individual who did work in the previous
period, the choice set includes working full-time or part-time for the same or new employer as
well as not working, 5 possible employment states. For married couples, the choice set is
conditioned on the previous period’s joint employment state (both worked in the previous period,
one worked but not the other, neither worked). If neither worked in the previous period, the
couple has 9 employment choices, if one worked and not the other they have 15 choices and if
both worked they have 25 choices. In addition, the couple decides on the consumption of each.
With respect to the state space, the number of state variables, excluding the random (unobserved)
state variables, exceeds ten for single individuals and twenty for married couples. 
Missing state variables reduce substantially the sample sizes available for estimating the
approximate decision rules. In estimating approximate decision rules, we include missing value
dummy variables for all of the state variables as a means of maintaining sample size. Under the
assumption that state variables are missing randomly, this method increases estimation precision;
it may also introduce bias unless all of the missing values are identical. If they are not randomly Obviously, with non-random non-response, throwing away observations with missing
35
data will also lead to bias.
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missing, then the estimates of the approximate decision rules will be biased regardless of whether
dummies are introduced or observations with missing values are deleted.  We deal with both
35
random and non-random non-response in the structural estimation of the model (see below).  
Our goal in specifying auxiliary models is to maintain a reasonable degree of precision in
the parameter estimates, while still providing enough score functions to achieve identification of
the structural parameters. Therefore, we do not include all of the state variables in the
approximate decision rules as dictated by the theory, and for that reason it is best to think of them
as “restricted” approximate decision rules. It should be noted that given unobserved
heterogeneity, approximate decision rules based solely on observable state variables will be
inconsistent  (with respect to the approximate decision rules’ true parameters). However, the use
of indirect inference to recover the structural parameters does not require that the approximate
decision rules be estimated consistently in order that the estimates of the structural parameters be
consistent. In fact, we included additional variables in the direct “structural” relationships, e.g., in
the health transition function, other than those that are specified in the structure to help identify
the unobserved heterogeneity parameters. In the case of the wage function, we include additional
variables not found in the structural wage offer function, in order to account for the fact that we
observe only accepted wages, that is, wages for those who have chosen to work.
Through the 1996 wave, only about one-fifth of the HRS respondents in our sample had
reached age 62, the early social security retirement age. Counting the spouses of HRS
respondents, the proportion reaching early retirement age is about three-tenths. Thus, the
estimated incentive effects of the social security system on labor supply and savings would be,
with this sample, to a great extent an extrapolation outside of the sample age range. To augment
the information about behavior upon reaching age 62, we make use of subjective expectations
questions available in the HRS. Respondents who were under the age of 62 and currently
working were asked in each wave to report the percent chance that they would work full time
after reaching 62. In the context of the behavioral model, the answer to that question will be a
function of the state variables at the time the question was asked. Similarly, additional  Because the auxiliary models do not represent behaviorally interpretable parameters,
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we do not present the auxiliary model estimates. They are available on request.
 We used these separate specifications rather than a single specification including all of
37
the variables because we found the estimation algorithm to be more stable with specifications
with smaller numbers of parameters. 
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information about asset accumulation is contained in questions concerning bequest propensities.
Respondents were asked about the percent chance they would leave bequests exceeding 10,000
and 100,000 dollars.
An additional subjective expectations question used in the estimation is related to 
subjective mortality risk. As noted, the estimated mortality risk function is based on a small
number of within-sample deaths. Extrapolating mortality risk to ages far out of the range of ages
among those that died could be considerably inaccurate. Respondent reports of the percent
chance of living to age 75 and to age 85, are functions of the same state variables that enter the
mortality risk function.
In the model, it was assumed that social security rules may be changed in the future. It
would be difficult to identify the forecasts that people use simply on the basis of their behavior.
However, respondents in the HRS are asked to report the amount of benefits they expect to
receive when they retire. Since we know AIME and covered quarters, and the model provides a
forecast of (the distributions of)  future labor supply and wages, differences between the expected
amount of social security and the amount forecasted by the model together will determine 
expectations about future changes in social security rules.
The following comprise the set of auxiliary models used in estimation (the number of
parameters is in parentheses, including missing value dummies):
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   1. Multinomial logits of full- and part-time employment: There are 29 separate multinomial
logits (7 by each of four marital status - gender categories and one for couples only) using
alternative sets of variables representing groups of variables such as age, health, social security
status, net worth, and work experience (346 score functions).  The union of the set of variables
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included in the specifications are: age (linear and age categories), race, education, lagged full-
time work dummy, lagged part-time work dummy, cumulative hours worked, cumulative hours
of tenure for current employer, health status, lagged health insurance coverage, number of Recall that net asset stocks are collected at the time of each interview and are thus only
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available every two years. In the decision model, net worth collected at the 1992 interview is the
state variable for 1992 decisions, assets collected at the 1994 interview reflect the 1993
consumption (and saving) decision and also serves as the state variable for 1994 decisions, and
assets collected at the 1996 interview reflect 1995 consumption (and saving) and is the state
variable for 1996 decisions. Thus, there are two years of asset choices, at the age corresponding
to calendar years 1993 and 1995. However, the asset state variables for these choices, assets at
the start of 1993 and 1995, are not available, although assets two years prior, at the start of 1992
and 1994, are. 
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quarters of covered earnings, AIME, amount of current private pension income, lagged net worth,
dummy for age greater than or equal to 62 x dummy for social security eligibility, the latter
variable x AIME, age of spouse at least 62, dummies for missing values of each of the above
variables.
   2. Multinomial logit of the transition from employment to a new or old employer: There are
four separate specifications, one for each marital status and sex (34 score functions). The union
of the set of variables included in the specifications are: age, lagged full-time work dummy,
cumulative hours of tenure with current employer, lagged health insurance status, missing value
dummies.
   3. Regression of net worth : There are three specifications, one each for single males and 
females, and one for couples (27 score functions). The union of the set of variables included in
the specifications are: double-lagged net worth, amount of current private pension income,
cumulative hours worked, lagged full-time work dummy, lagged health status, race, spouse’s
education, spouse’s AIME, spouse’s lagged full-time work dummy, missing value dummies.
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    4. Regression of log (accepted) wages: Four specifications, one for each marital status - gender
category (51 score functions). The union of the set of variables included in the specifications are:
lagged log wage, education, cumulative hours worked, cumulative hours of tenure, AIME, health
status, lagged health insurance status, missing value dummies.
   5. Logit regression of receiving health insurance in a new job: Four specifications, one for each
marital status - gender category (28 score functions). The union of the set of variables included in
the specifications are: education, full-time work dummy, AIME, cumulative hours of job tenure
on previous job, missing value dummies.  
   6. Logit regression of health status transition:  Four specifications, one for each marital status -28
gender category (37 score functions). The union of the set of variables included in the
specifications are: education, AIME, race, cumulative hours of tenure, lagged full-time work
dummy, double-lagged health status, missing value dummies.
   7. Logit regression of mortality: One specification, marital status - gender categories combined
(10 score functions). The variables included are: age, lagged health status, lagged health
insurance status, race, dummies for marital status by gender, missing value dummies.
  8. Regression of percent chance working full time after age 62:  Four specifications, one for
each marital status - gender category  (45 score functions). The union of the set of variables
included in the specifications are: education, lagged full-time work and lagged part-time work
dummies, cumulative hours worked, cumulative hours of tenure, health status, current private
pension income, missing value dummies.
  9. Regression of percent chance of leaving a bequest of $10,000, of $100,000: Four
specifications, one for each marital status - gender category (59 score functions). The union of
the set of variables included in the specifications are: lagged net worth, education, AIME, health
status, cumulative hours worked, spouse’s education, spouse’s health status, spouse’s AIME,
missing value dummies.
 10. Regression of percent chance will live to 75, to 85:  Four specifications, one for each marital
status - gender category (44 score functions). The union of the set of variables included in the
specifications are: age , health status, race, missing value dummies.
 11. Regression of expected social security benefits  Four specifications, one for each marital
status - gender category (25 score functions). The union of the set of variables included in the
specifications are: age expect to receive social security, AIME, cumulative hours worked, health
status, missing value dummies. 
VII. Simulating the Data 
At given parameter values and having solved the optimization problem (having computed
the Emax functions), simulating one-step ahead decisions would be straightforward if all of the
state variables were observed in each period. For example, consider a hypothetical individual
who is 58 years old and unmarried as of the 1992 interview, and who is observed for five 12-
month periods, i.e., through age 62. Given the state variables at the 1992 interview, a simulation The imputed values are obtained by drawing randomly from groups categorized by age, 
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sex, race, schooling and marital status (as of the first interview). There are 36 groups for
unmarried individuals and 54 for married individuals. For any given individual, because of
sample size limitations, imputations for each state variable from the set of missing state variables
are drawn independently.      
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of the decision at age 58 for that individual would be obtained by drawing a vector of
contemporaneous shocks, for preferences, wages, etc., and choosing the alternative with the
highest value function. Similar simulations could be obtained at ages 59-62 based on the actual
state variables. If for a particular draw of the mortality shock the individual was simulated to
have died, the simulation of that individual would cease at that point. Net assets at that point
would determine the bequest. 
A similar procedure would be followed for married couples. Given their ages in 1992,
one would simulate the couple’s choices based on their observed state space in each period. If
one of them died, simulations would then proceed for the survivor as an unmarried individual
based on a state space that carries forward their spouse’s AIME. The bequest amount would be
determined after both had died.
However, it is not possible to simulate a decision in a period in which a state variable is
missing. If a state variable was missing randomly, one could apply an imputation method, say by
drawing a value for the missing state variable from individuals matched according to some set of
exogenous characteristics. One would then simulate the decision based on the state variables that
are observed and the imputed state variable for that observation. A similar procedure could be
followed if several state variables were missing. 
This procedure is problematic if state variables are not missing randomly. To account for
biased non-reporting, the following modified imputation procedure can be used. For continuous
state variables, such as net assets, AIME, work experience etc., it is assumed that the actual value
of the state variable is given by the imputed value times a bias parameter that is estimated.  It is
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this value of the state variable that is used to simulate the decision. For binary state variables,
such as health status, lagged employment status or having forty or more quarters of covered
earnings etc., again draw an imputed value. If it’s a one (zero), estimate a parameter that
determines whether it should have been a zero (one) and redraw a value from a uniform Also, because so many state variables are missing in 1993 and 1995, we only use the
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actual (and imputed ) state variables for 1992 and 1994. For 1993, we update the 1992 state
variables by the 1992 decisions and the 1995 and 1996 state variables by the1994 and 1995
decisions. 
 Reporting bias for missing state variables is assumed not to vary by type. 
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 Clearly, this regression would provide no more information than one which throws out
42
the observations with missing net worth at t-2 if there were no other regressors with non-missing
values. 
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distribution that is used in the simulation. In our implementation, the bias parameter is set to zero
for all state variables other than net assets.  
40
This procedure for simulating data assumes that the population is homogenous with
respect to unobservables. As noted, we incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in the model by
allowing for a finite number (two) of discrete types of individuals that differ in preferences and
constraints. The probability that a simulated individual is a given type depends on the initial state
variables, inclusive of imputed values modified for non-random reporting.  Given that
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probability, each simulated observation is identified as a particular type by drawing from the type
probability function. 
It is useful to explain the procedure with a specific example. Consider a simplified
version of the net worth auxiliary model (3 above) in which net worth is regressed only on net
worth two periods before; as already noted, net worth is reported only every other year. There are
four cases to consider: (1) net worth is reported at t-2 and at t; (2) net worth is reported at t-2, but
not at t; (3) net worth is not reported at t-2, but is reported at t; (4) net worth is not reported at
either t-2 or at t. The auxiliary model regresses net worth at t on two variables, net worth at t-2
and a dummy variable equal to one if net worth is missing at t-2 and zero otherwise; where net
worth at t-2 is set to some arbitrary number, say zero, if it’s missing.  
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In the first case, where net worth is observed at t-2, we simulate the choices at t-1,
including net worth at period t-1 (which is not observed in the data), update the state space and
simulate the choices at t, including net worth at t. The simulated net worth at t and the observed
net worth at t-2 enter into the score functions evaluated in equation (13). In case 2, because net
worth at t was not available to be used in the estimation of the auxiliary model, we do not use
this observation (although we do have a simulated value of net worth at t) in (13). In the third We perform 20 simulations for each sample observation, an individual or a couple,
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although we only draw a single imputed value for missing state variables.
 See Hubbard et. al. (1995). As noted by Keane and Wolpin (2001), this discrepancy
44
may be due to the explicit allowance for borrowing constraints.
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case, we impute a net worth value at t-2, accounting for potentially biased non-response based on
our estimate of the bias, simulate net worth through period t, and treat the observation as it was
used in the auxiliary model. That is, we use the simulated value of net worth at t, but treat net
worth at t-2 as missing. The last case is treated like the second because net worth at t is missing.
Having simulated data, the criterion function (13) is calculated for each of the auxiliary
models.  We iterate on the parameters using a simplex algorithm until the sum over the auxiliary
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models of (13) is minimized. The parameters include those of the behavioral model, those of the
type probability function and those defining the bias in missing state variables.
VIII. Results
A. Parameter Estimates: The functional forms of the model’s structure are provided in
appendix table A.1. Appendix table A.2 provides parameter estimates and associated standard
errors. A number of the parameters are worth highlighting and provide some evidence about the
credibility of the model. The coefficient of relative risk aversion (1 -  ) is estimated to be around
1.678 for type 1 individuals and 1.591 for type two individuals, somewhat lower than generally
found in the literature.  These households are estimated to be severely borrowing constrained.
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The lower bound on net assets for single households is about -6,400 at age 50, falls to -5,000 at
age 60 and to -2,700 at age 75. For married household, the borrowing constraint is slightly less
binding, about -7,200 for couples who are both 50 and -3,100 when they are both 75.  
The estimates imply that consumption and leisure are substitutes  and that the
marginal utility of consumption increases with good health  . In addition, the marginal
disutility of hours of work is greater for those in poor health  . Transiting from less to more
work is costly, that is, the cost of transiting from not working to working part-time is less than
transiting to working full-time  and there is a cost to transiting from part-time to full-
time work  . There is also a cost to changing jobs  , although it is significantly
smaller than that of labor market entry. The disutility of working is lower for married individuals
as the hours worked of the partner increases, that is, the leisure time of couples is See Hurd and McGarry (1995, 2002).
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 We use is the Period Life Table, 2000 obtained from the Social Security Administration
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web site: www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html.





With respect to the estimates of the wage offer function, an additional year of schooling
increases offered wages by 6.4 percent, wage offers peak at 54,500 hours of work experience (27
years of full-time work) and at 47,000 hours of tenure (23.5 years of full-time work on the same
job) and are 6.8 percent lower for blacks. We discuss the type-specific differences in wage offers
below.
The survival hazard function is estimated primarily from the expectations question about
survival chances to age 75 and 85, although recall that a regression of actual deaths is also
included among the auxiliary models. Previous work has shown that expectations data on
mortality risk is generally consistent with life tables.  Because we allow for unobserved
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heterogeneity in the survival hazard function that is correlated with heterogeneity in other
structural components of the model (for example, in the wage offer function) the parameters of
the hazard function are jointly estimated with the other parameters of the model. Qualitatively,
we find that those in poor health, those without health insurance, males and blacks have higher
mortality risk. Moreover, being in poor health together with having no health insurance further
heightens mortality risk.
Quantitatively, our estimates of mortality hazards are not very different from life table
estimates. Specifically, accounting for the distribution of poor health in our sample, the mortality
risk at age 51 for males predicted from our model is .0058, identical to the life table estimate.
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For males age 61 our prediction is .0139 compared to the life table figure of .0137. While these
are remarkably close, the predictions for females is not as good. At age 51 our prediction is .0048
as compared to .0034 in the life table and at age 61, .1029 as compared to .0086.  Poor health is
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predicted to have a large impact on mortality risk. At age 75, men in poor health are predicted to
have a mortality rate of .0885, while those in good health have only a mortality rate of .0152. The
predictions for females are almost identical; the difference in mortality rates at that age, .048 for Model predictions are obtained by simulating choices for each single person ten times
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for each of the two types, and for each married couple five times for each of the four types. In
comparing the simulated data sample statistics to the unweighted data, the simulation
observations are weighted by their type proportions. In comparing the simulated data sample
statistics to the weighted data, the simulation observations are weighted by the product of their
type proportions and the HRS household weights.
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men and .031 for women from the life table, would arise solely from the greater incidence of
poor health for men than for women. To account for the life table difference, 44.7 percent of men
would have to be in poor health as compared to only 22.2 percent of women.
In the model, new jobs come with a wage offer, part of which is a firm-specific
component, and may also come with a health insurance offer. We modeled the probability of
receiving a health insurance offer as depending on an individual’s current health and on the firm-
specific component of the wage offer. Our estimates imply that the probability of receiving a job
offer that includes health insurance (conditional on receiving an offer) is essentially invariant to 
the individual’s health, .212 in either case. Although negative, the relationship between the firm-
specific component of the wage offer and the probability of receiving health insurance is also
negligible and the probability that a health insurance offer requires full-time work is 0.73. In
addition, having made job-to-job transitions over their life cycle, those who are currently working
have a firm-specific component of their current wage that is on average 29.9 percent higher than
the average firm-specific component of the offer that they would receive from a new firm. 
B. Model Fit:
Tables 2-9 provide evidence on the within-sample fit of the model as well as
demonstrating other features of the data. These tables use the household weights and, thus, the
figures are representative for the population of households with the selected characteristics of our
estimation sample. Appendix tables B.1-B.6, corresponding to tables 3-9, are based on
unweighted data.   Tables C.1-C.4 report the same statistics as in tables 2-5 for the non-pension
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subsample of households, that is, those for which the individual was not currently, or
anticipating, collecting on a defined benefit pension plan from a previous job. 
Table 2 reports non-employment rates by age for each marital status-gender group for the
actual data and as predicted by the model, both for weighted and unweighted data. Because in a
12 month period, an individual will usually span two ages (in years), we present the data for This decline may capture both life cycle and cohort changes. The upturn in full-time
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employment rates for married females at ages 64-65 through 66+ would seem to indicate that
cohort effects may be important. The model captures cohort effects by allowing type proportions
to vary with initial (wave1) age. 
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those age 60 and above as two-year moving averages. Although this tends to smooth over abrupt
changes, such changes are still generally apparent. For ease of presentation, we group together
those age 50-59 and also those age 66 and over. It is more salient to concentrate on the weighted
data because of their representativeness. Married males have by far the lowest average non-
employment rate between ages 50-59, 37.5 percent, followed by single females at 51.1 percent,
single males at 60.1 percent and married females at 63.2 percent. All groups increase their non-
employment rates considerably in their 60's. Between age 60-61 and age 61-62, the first time
some of them reach the social security early retirement age, non-employment rates increase by
7.5 percentage points for married males; similarly, between 61-62 and 62-63, when the rest of the
sample also reaches 62, the increase is by 5.5 percentage points. For married and single females,
the combined increase between age 60-61 and 62-63 is 9 to10 percentage points. However, there
is essentially no increase for single males, although they had the largest increase between 50-59
and 60-61. The model fits the pattern for these groups reasonably well. For all groups, the model,
however, understates the increase between 50-59 and 60-61 and tends to overstate the increase
from 60-61 to 62-63. By age 64-65, the model corresponds quite well with the data for married
males and single females, but overstates the non-employment rate for married females.
Non-employment rates for the no pension sample (table C.1) are, not surprisingly,
considerably lower than for the overall sample for all groups and at all ages. The increase in the
non-employment rate between the ages of 60-61 and 62-63 is 18.5 percentage points for married
males, 12.4 percentage points for married females and 11.7 percentage points for single females,
somewhat larger than for the overall sample. As with the overall sample, there is no increase for
single men. Model fit, as expected, is somewhat worse for the subsample, but the increase in
non-employment spanning the early retirement age is captured well.
Tables 3 breaks down employment rates into full- and part-time. As seen, full-time
employment rates decline almost monotonically for married males with age; there is a decline of
15.1 percentage points between ages 60-61 and 62-63.  Over the same ages, there is a decline of
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7.1 percentage points for married females. The model predictions are declines of 14.6 and 10.7
percentage points. The decline is even larger for the no pension subsample (table C.2), 19.0
percentage points for married males and 10.5 percentage points for married females and is
captured almost exactly by the model. For married males and females, part-time employment
rates are roughly constant up to age 61-62 and then increase slightly for married males, while
they decline slightly for married females. For both the overall and restricted samples, the model
captures the increase for the married males, although not by as much, and captures the decline for
females, although it is overstated.
The full-time employment rate for single males follows a u-shape. The model, while
picking up the first large decline, predicts its continuation, rather than the increase. Instead, the
model predicts a large increase in part-time employment at the last two ages. Following a large
decline in full-time employment between 50-59 and 60-61, for single females there is a
continuing decline through the age of early retirement eligibility and then a leveling off. The
model captures this decline. As with single males, the model diverges from the data at the last
two ages, predicting a continued decline and an increase in part-time employment when neither
occurs. This description holds as well in the no pension sample.
Tables 4 compares actual and predicted statistics for (accepted) full- and part-time wages
by marital status and gender (table C.3 does the same for the restricted sample). It should be
emphasized that the model estimates the structural wage offer distribution and that wages are
observed only for those who have chosen to work. Matching full- and part-time employment
rates and the full- and part-time accepted wage distribution is therefore challenging. As seen in
table 4, the  mean and  median full- and part-time wages are greatest for married men, least for
married women and similar for single males and females. The mean (accepted) full-time hourly
wage for married males is three dollars more than for married females and two and a half dollars
more than for single males and females. Part-time wages are almost the same for all groups
except married females, which are lower by almost 2 dollars per hour. Medians are lower than
means, reflecting the ususal right skewness, and standard deviations are generally large relative
to the means. Predicted mean and median wages tend to be within about a dollar of the
corresponding actual figures and are often much closer. The fit to the standard deviations is more36
variable. Table C.3 reveals much the same picture for the restricted sample, although the wage
differentials among the groups tends to be less and predicted wages are generally not as close to
actual wages.  
It is obviously important that the model capture the major features of the net worth
distribution. Tables 5 provide statistics for the overall sample (table C.4 for the no pension
sample) on the actual and predicted distributions for married couples and for single men and
women. The actual distribution of net worth within each group, as has been well documented and
as seen in table 5, is quite disperse and heavily right-skewed. The mean level of net assets for
married males in the weighted sample is $125,432, with a standard deviation a bit more than one
and a half times that amount and a median value about half that amount. Mean net worth is quite
low for single men and women, $44,491 for men and $32,876 for women. Moreover, the median
is only $1,650 for men and $600 for women. The large degree of inequality in net worth is clear
from the table. As also shown net worth is higher for older married individuals in this population,
but not for older single individuals. Importantly, there are generally only small differences in all
marital-gender groups between the distribution of net worth generated by the model and the
distribution in the data. The model not only fits well the mean and median, but also the 10  and
th
90  percentiles, as well as the age pattern. These basic features of the data and fit are seen also
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for the restricted sample. In particular, net assets are considerably less for individuals in all
groups who did not previously work on a job with a defined benefit pension plan, a feature that 
the model clearly captures.
Tables 6 presents actual and predicted employment transition rates, again by marital
status and gender. Non-employment appears to be close to an absorbing state for all groups; year-
to year transition rates to either full- or part-time employment from non-employment are only
between one and three percent. The model captures much, but not all, of this permanence.
Although the predicted transition rate out of non-employment is less than 10 percent for all
groups, the model overstates transitions from non-employment to full-time employment. With
respect to the employed states, between 85 and 90 percent of those employed full-time in any
year tend to remain employed full-time in the following year, while about 60 percent of those
working part-time make the same choice in the following period; single males are an exception37
with 45 percent. The model does not capture quite the same degree of permanence in full-time
employment for any of the groups, the transition from full-time employment to the same state
being between 69 and 77 percent. The model does better in capturing the permanence of part-
time employment, except in the case of married women where it is understated and single men
where it is overstated, and the model generally overstates transitions from part-time to full-time
employment.
Table 7 reports on the model’s fit to the expectations data. These variables are forecasted
by averaging over the simulated lifetime sequences of choices and outcomes based on current
state variables. Results are not unreasonable, if somewhat mixed. The model underpredicts the
reported percent chance of working full-time after age 62 for males, by 12 percentage points for
married males and by 9 percentage points for singles, and overpredicts it for married females, by
17 percentage points, but is within 0.1 percentage points for single females. The model fairly
closely predicts the reported percent change of being alive at age 75 and 85. With respect to
anticipated bequests, the model overstates both the percent chance of leaving a bequest of 10,000
dollars and 100,000 dollars for all groups, generally by between 10 and 15 percentage points.
Finally, the predicted expected social security amount is within one percent of the actual for
married males,16 percent too low for married males, 30 percent too low for single males and 47
percent too low for single females. Interestingly, the model’s understatement is not due to its
prediction of expectations held about the future of social security. We estimate that the
individuals in our sample believe there will be no changes in the rules as it affects their benefits.   
Table 8 considers the joint labor supply of husband and wives. The table varies the
husband’s age while keeping the wife’s age fixed between 50-59. Although wives age as the
husband’s age increases, the wive’s increase, given the age restriction, is slower so that the age
difference increases. The prevalence of couples who both work falls from 30.3 percent when the
husband is between the ages of 50 and 59 to 13.8 percent when the husband is 60 or 61. The fall
in joint employment is almost  entirely made up by an increase in the percent of couples in which
neither work. The percent of married households in which both work continues to fall gradually
with the husband’s age, reaching 10.3 percent for couples in which the husband is 65 to 66. On
the other hand, as the husband ages beyond 60, the percent of households in which only the38
husband works falls, from 28.8 percent when the husband is 60-61 to 7.5 percent when the
husband is 64-65. There is a concomitant small rise in the percent of households in which only
the wife works, from 13.7 percent when the husband is 50-59 to 20.8 percent when the husband
is 64-65, but the main shift is towards neither working. The model considerably understates the
extent to which both are working when the husband is between 50-59, compensating by
overstating the situation in which only the husband works. The model does reasonably well from
age 60 on, capturing the overall movement from the situation in which only the husband is
working to the one in which neither is working, albeit continuing to overstate the extent to which
only husbands work. In the data, the proportion of couples in which only the husband works falls
23 percentage points between 50-59 and 64-65 and by 28 percentage points in the model.
Similarly, the rise in proportion of couples in which neither works is almost identical in the data
and in the model over these same ages. 
Tables 9 compares actual and simulated labor supply choices for married and single
individuals by several characteristics: whether or not they were receiving income from a private
defined benefit pension in 1992, their current health status and their completed education.
Employment differences in the data tend to be large. As already noted, those receiving income
from a defined benefit private pension are much less likely to work and more likely to work part
time if they work. A similarly larger proportion of those who report being in poor health are non-
participants compared to those who do not report poor health. Employment differences between
those who did not and those who did complete high school tend to be relatively small for married
males and especially large for single females. All of these are features of the model as well.
Although not specifically related to model fit, tables 10 and 11 highlight the importance
of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. In the estimation, we allowed for two types for each
sex. Thus, single individuals are one of two types, while married couples are of potentially four
types. Our estimation reveals interesting differences in behaviors as well as important marital
selectivity according to type. We estimate that 49.6 percent of males in the HRS birth cohort
(those 51-61 in 1992) are of their sex-specific type 1 (50.4 percent are of type 2) and 69.5 percent
of women are of their sex-specific type one (30.5 are of type 2). As the tables show, there is
clearly marital selection by type. For males within the HRS birth cohort, 98.7 percent of those The figures are only slightly different if we do not restrict the sample to married
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couples in which both are from the original HRS age cohort. For all married males in the sample,
16.0 percent are type 1 and for all married females, 79.3 percent.
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who are single are type one, while that’s true of only 7.2 percent of those who are married (and
married to a female in the HRS cohort). For females, 58.2 percent of those who are single and
80.6 percent of those who are married (to males in the HRS cohort) are type 1.  Thus, type one
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males are over-represented and type one females are under-represented among singles. 
Among singles, there is little variation in mean schooling levels by type; the difference is
only .1 years both for males and females. There is considerably more variation among married
couples. Mean schooling of couples in which both are type one is the highest for both spouses,
11.8 for men and 11.5 for women, and is the lowest for couples in which both are type 2, 10.9 for
men and 10.7 for women. There seems to be positive assortative mating on schooling across the
four types. Single men differ only slightly by type in their labor supply, average net worth or
average annual consumption. However, they do differ significantly in their annual earnings,
which is almost entirely due to the fact that they receive lower wage offers than do type 2 males;
as seen in table A.2, type 1 males receive a 40 percent lower wage offer than otherwise identical
type 2 males. Single women differ to a greater extent by type than do single men. Only 20.9
percent of single women of type 1 engage in market work as compared to 84.6 percent of type 2
women. Because they participate so much less, the annual earnings of type 1 single women are
about one-third as large as those of type 2 single women even though the wage offer to otherwise
identical type one women (independent of marital status) is 37.7 percent lower (see table A.2).
Type one women work much less because they have a much greater distaste for market work than
do type 2 women (see table A.2).
This distaste for work of type one women shows up again among type 1 married women,
regardless of the type of their husband. Only 14.6 percent of type 1 women work when coupled
with type 1 men and only 6.5 percent work when coupled with type 2 men. About 70 percent of
the husbands of each type work. On the other hand, type 2 married women participate more than
their husbands, although these couples comprise only 19.4 percent of all married couples. These
different labor supply patterns of husbands and wives show up in their relative annual earnings as
well, with one exception. Husbands earn more than their wives in households where both are The mean level of schooling is 9.8 for the no-pension subsample and 12.6 for the
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sample with a prior pension job.
 Married men are on average 57.6 and married women 56.7 years of age in the first age
52
range; they are approximately 8 years older, 65.8 and 64.9, in the second age range. Single men
are, on average, 57.9 and 65.3 in the two ranges and single women, 57.8 and 65.4. Table C.5
breaks down the labor supply effect by finer age intervals. 
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type 2 even though the wives participate about twice as much as their husbands. As with singles,
this is due to the lower wage offer received by type two women, who also have a lower disutility
of working than do their husbands (see table A.2). 
An interesting pattern in the share of household consumption emerges from our estimates.
Type 1 wives, who contribute only a small amount to total household earnings (20 percent in one
case and 6 percent in the other), share about equally in total household consumption, while type 2
wives, who contribute much more to total earnings (60 percent in one case and 47 percent in the
other) receive less than a 20 percent share of total consumption. In addition to type 2 wives
having lower disutility from working, as seen in table A.2, type 2 wives have less bargaining
power than do type 1 wives. 
IX. Counterfactual Experiments:
Tables 12-14 provide estimates, for the subsample of households without a prior pension
job, of the effect of altering social security program parameters on labor supply and net assets,
the two choice variables of the model, for married couples (table 12), single men (table 13) and
single women (table 14). We choose to focus on the no-pension sample because it would be most
at risk from the types of changes in the social security program that have been proposed.  
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Married couples are restricted to those in which both the male and the female fall within the age
range 51 to 61 as of 1992, that is, to those married households in which both are in the HRS
cohort. The tables also report the effects implied by these choices on consumption, earnings and
social security take-up and benefit amounts. The first column in each table provides the baseline
data. The effects are shown for two age categories: 51-61 and 62-69.  In contrast to the previous
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tables in which predictions are made only for the estimation sample and condition on state
variables observed in 1992 and 1994, these tables forecast behaviors outside of the estimation
sample and are conditioned only on 1992 state variables. We will consider each programmatic As in the prior tables, the statistics from the simulations use household weights.
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change in turn, although we first consider the baseline predictions for the two age periods.
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As seen in table 12, there is a significant reduction in the participation of both husbands
and wives between the ages before and after social security eligibility; the non-employment rate
increases from 27.0 to 48.7 percent for husbands and from 75.9 to 84.2 percent for wives. For
husbands, the fall in the rate of full-time work is actually larger than the increase in the non-
employment rate by about 9 percentage points, reflecting an increase of that amount in the rate of
part-time work (from 4.7 to 13.6 percent). Wives, on the other hand, do not, on average, transit
from full-time employment to part-time work after reaching age 62. Overall, average annual
hours worked falls by 37 percent  for both husbands and wives, although husbands supply 3
times as many hours as their wives. Husband’s take a larger share of total household
consumption, 54 percent in the first age range and 57 percent in the second, and household
consumption is 20 percent higher in the older than in the younger age range. Income from social
security is almost 10,000 for the household. Net assets increase by 74 percent between the two
age ranges.   
Single males reduce their participation considerably less after eligibility than do their
married counterparts. Indeed, the large fall in full-time employment (from 32.7 to 10.3 percent) is
almost completely offset by the rise in part-time employment (from 10.2 to 31.7 percent).
Overall, however, the fall in average annual hours of 31 percent, is comparable. Average annual
consumption is almost the same in the two age periods and significantly less than the married
men. Income from social security is about 5,300 dollars per year, about half that of the married
households. As with married households, net assets increase substantially over the periods, by 77
percent, although they are only about one-fifth that of married households.
Single females, as already noted, work more than married females and single men and the
change in their labor supply after eligibility is also different. Like both single males and married
females, single females reduce their full-time employment substantially (from 40.3 to 24.0
percent). However, unlike married females, they also increase their part-time employment (from
13.2 to 22.9), but not, as with single males, to the extent that it completely offsets the fall in full-
time employment. Overall, the fall in average annual hours, of 24 percent, is smaller than that of42
either married females or single males. Average annual consumption is, like single males, almost
constant across the periods and is larger than that of married females, although only slightly so in
the later age period. Income from social security is about 3,000, considerably less than for single
men because of a smaller take-up rate (in part because they have a higher full-time employment
rate).
Five experiments are performed: a reduction in benefits (separately by 25 and 50 percent),
an increase in the employee payroll tax to15 percent, the elimination of the earnings tax,
eliminating the early retirement age (eligibility begins only at age 65) and raising the eligibility
age to 70 (and no early retirement). 
1. Benefit Reduction:
Married couples: As seen in table 12, a 25 percent reduction in benefits slightly reduces
participation of both husbands and wives in the 51-61 age range and increases their participation
in the 62-69 age range. The change in the latter age range is much larger for husbands than for
wives. Full-time employment of husbands increases by 7.4 percentage points, while part-time
employment falls by 3.8 percentage points. Overall, average annual hours worked by husbands
falls by 29 hours (2 percent) over the 51-61 age range, but increases by 116 hours (13 percent)
over the 62-69 age range. The comparable changes for wives are 15 (3 percent) and 34 (12
percent) hours. Due to the changes in their labor supply, the average annual earnings of both
spouses decrease when they are 51 to 61, by 267 dollars for husbands and by 116 dollars for
wives, but increase by 1,173 dollars for husbands and 169 dollars for wives. The reduction in
benefits thus leads to intertemporal substitution in annual hours - given forward looking
behavior, married couples substitute slightly more leisure before eligibility for the reduced leisure
after eligibility. The fact that the direction of the effect is the same for both husbands and wives
reflects the leisure complementarity implied by our estimated utility parameters.
Average annual consumption for the household, the sum of consumption, falls in both
periods, by 414 dollars (2.8 percent) in the 51-61 age range and by 708 dollars (4.0 percent) in
the 62-69 age range. The fall in household consumption is shared fairly equally between the
husband and wife; for example, in the 51-61 age range, the husband’s consumption falls by 233
dollars (2.9 percent) and the wife’s by 181 dollars (2.7 percent). The household’s average net43
assets increase by a negligible amount before eligibility, but falls by 2.2 percent over the later age
range. Thus, after gaining eligibility the household both increases its labor supply and reduces
assets in order to make up for the consumption loss associated with the lower benefits. Although
the lower benefits reduce the social security take-up rate by a small fraction, the fall in average
monthly social security benefits received by the husband and wife, by 229 dollars or 28.0 percent,
is almost entirely due to the benefit reduction.
All of the effects are magnified with a 50 percent reduction in benefits. Household labor
supply increases by 310 hours per year (25 percent) over the 62-69 age range, with a concomitant
increase in household earnings of over 3,000 dollars (27 percent). Net asset holdings fall by
almost 4,000 dollars per year and consumption by 1,500 dollars. Average social security benefits
fall by over 5,000 per year.     
Single Males: A 25 percent reduction in benefits reduces participation by 3.1 percentage
points in the 51-61 age range, coming both from a reduction in full- and part-time work. There is,
surprisingly, also a small reduction in the participation rate in the 62-69 age range (0.2
percentage points). However, there is a shift towards full-time employment leading to an increase
in annual average hours worked (from 543 to 588 hours, or 8 percent), reflecting, as with married
couples, intertemporal substitution. Average annual consumption falls in both periods, by a little
more in the second (3.8 percent in the first and 5.7 percent in the second age period). As with
married couples, average net assets increases in the 51-61 age range (by 2.3 percent) and falls in
the 62-69 age range (by 3.9 percent). All of these effects are magnified when benefits are reduced
by 50 percent reduction. 
Single Females: The effect of benefit reduction is qualitatively similar for single females.
Intertemporal labor supply effects are present, leading to a near equalization of average annual
hours in the two age period when benefits are reduced by 50 percent. Although consumption falls
by more in the second period, the fall in income that occurs from the reduction in benefits, about
1,000 dollars for the 25 percent reduction, is significantly compensated for by the increased
earnings. 
2. Increasing the payroll tax:
Married couples: Raising the payroll tax to 15 percent, as expected, increases non-44
employment rates. As with benefit reductions, the effects are larger for husbands. The non-
employment rate increases by about 4.7 percentage points for husbands age 51-61 and by 6.8
percentage points for husbands age 62-69; average annual hours fall by 94 hours (6 percent) in
the first age range and by about 149 (16 percent )in the second. Concomitantly, the household’s
average annual earnings falls by 5.4 and 15.3 percent. Household annual average consumption
falls by 8.1 percent at the earlier ages and by 7.7 percent at the later ages, while average net
assets falls by 5.0 and 7.6 percent. Average social security benefits actually rises, though only by
a small amount, because of the higher take-up rate induced by the additional work disincentive.
Single Males: The greater disincentive to work caused by raising the payroll tax increases
the rate of non-employment for single males even more than for married males. Average annual
hours falls by 17.3 percent in the first age range and by 29.3 percent in the second, with large
percentage falls also in average annual earnings (19.3 and 14.8 percent). However, average
annual consumption declines by less as average net assets falls by 9.5 and 16.5 percent.
Single Females: The labor supply response for single females differs slightly from single
and married males in that while non-employment rates rise and full-time employment rates fall,
there is also a marked increase in part-time employment and a smaller decline in annual hours
overall. All of the other patterns are quite similar.
3. Eliminating the earnings tax:
Married couples: Eliminating the earnings tax reduces non-employment, particularly for
husbands after reaching age 62. However, there is also a slight increase in employment before
age 62 for husbands, although average annual hours is essentially unchanged. After age 62, the
full-time employment rate of husbands increases by 9.2 percentage points, while the part-time
rate falls by 4.6 percentage points. The overall increase in average annual hours is by 145 hours
(15.6 percent). And, there is also an increase for wives after age 62, by 56 hours (19.2 percent).  
Household earnings and consumption both increase slightly in the first period, the latter
in small part due to a reduction in net assets (presumably, to smooth consumption). The take-up
rate rises essentially to 100 percent, as eligibility is unaffected by earnings, and there is a
considerable increase in average benefits, both because earnings are not taxed and because
everyone who is eligible receives benefits. Net assets rise considerably in the second period as45
some of the extra income is saved. 
Single Males: The effect on the labor supply pattern of single males is dramatic. Although
there is little drop in the non-employment rate after age 62, there is a large shift from part-time to
full-time work that is essentially offsetting (by about 20 percentage points), increasing average
annual hours by 271 (50.0 percent). Before age 62, there is a small increase in both part- and full-
time work, increasing annual hours by 6.6 percent. As with married couples, net assets fall
slightly in the first period and increase significantly in the second.
Single Females: The effect on the labor supply pattern of single females is similar to that
of single males, although somewhat less dramatic in that the increase in the full-time
employment rate after age 62 is not completely offset by the decline in the part-time employment
rate. Average annual hours thus increases by less than for single males, although still
substantially (from 737 to 950, 28.9 percent). All other effects are also quite similar as the other
groups.
4. No benefits until age 65 (eliminating early retirement):
Married couples: Eliminating early retirement increases employment rates of husbands by
a small amount before and by a significant amount after age 62. As with the other experiments,
there is a much smaller effect on the labor supply of wives. Household earnings and consumption
are essentially unchanged in the first period and there is a slight increase in net assets in order to
augment consumption in the second period when there are no social security benefits between 62
and 64. The increase in household earnings in the second period and the fall in net assets
compensate to leave household consumption essentially unchanged. 
Single Males: The labor supply response of single males is similar to eliminating the
earnings tax. Although the first is obviously welfare improving, they both provide a strong
incentive to work after age 62 and the single males again shift from part- to full-time work. The
effect on annual hours after age 62 is of the same order of magnitude. The labor response after
age 62 is so large that consumption also increases relative to the baseline as does net assets. 
Single Females: As with males, the response of single females is also similar to the
response to eliminating the earnings tax, namely a strong substitution of full-time for part-time
work after age62 and the maintenance of consumption after age 62 at pre-treatment levels.46
5. No benefits until age 70:
Married couples: Eliminating all benefits until age 70 has essentially no additional impact
on behaviors before age 62 above that of eliminating benefits until age 65 in the previous
experiment. However, the effects after age 62 are different and not monotonic with respect to the
previous experiment. Although non-employment rates continue to fall and full-time employment
rates are higher for husbands and wives relative to the previous experiment, part-time
employment rates of husbands fall. And, while consumption rose after age 62 in the previous
experiment, eliminating benefits up to age 70 reduces consumption relative to the baseline even
though net assets fall by an additional large amount (from 117,624 in the previous experiment to
102,787).
Single Males: For single males, there are further effects on behaviors before age 62 of
eliminating benefits up to age 70 beyond those of the previous experiment. Annual hours and
earnings fall even further. After age 62, again effects are not monotonic. Annual hours and
earnings, though larger than in the baseline, are smaller than in the previous experiment.
Consumption also falls after age 62 as does net assets, although they both rose relative to the
baseline in the previous experiment. The elimination of the social security benefits that would
otherwise be received is too large for an optimal labor supply adjustment to compensate so as to
maintain consumption and savings levels.
Single Females: The effect on single females mirrors that on single males.
X. Conclusions:
In this paper, we have specified and estimated a dynamic model of retirement and savings
decisions for a low income subsample of households from the Health and Retirement Study. The
model incorporated a discrete employment decision (non-employment, part-or full-time
employment) and a continuous consumption decision for both unmarried men and women and
for married couples. Additional features of the model included a detailed specification of social
security rules, limited borrowing, probabilistic job offers from new firms specifying the wage and
health insurance availability, a bequest motive, uncertain health and survival, wages that evolve
with labor market experience and job tenure, and unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, wages
and health status. The model was estimated using the method of indirect inference. The estimated47
model was shown to reasonably fit many different aspect of the data.        
The model was used to understand the impact of changes in social security rules on
household labor supply, income and consumption. The estimated model forecasts large and
heterogeneous behavioral responses, with those of singles generally exceeding those of married
individuals, and those of husbands being considerable larger than those of wives. In case of a
reduction in social security benefits of 25 percent, we find moderately large reductions in labor
supply at ages below 62 (2-3 percent for married, 5-7 percent for singles), and large increases in
annual hours worked at ages 62-69 (12 percent for married, 8 percent for singles). Increasing the
social security payroll tax to 15 percent, a large change in itself, is predicted to lead to
considerable reductions in annual hours worked at all ages, with average annual hours of working
at ages 62-69 falling by 5 percent for wives, 14 percent for single women, 16 percent for
husbands, and 29 percent for single males, with similar but somewhat smaller reductions at  ages
51-61. These reductions take the form of increases in both non-employment and in part-time
work, except for single males for whom the part-time rate drops.
We find qualitatively similar responses in labor supply to the removal of the earnings test,
the elimination of early retirement, and a postponement of the earliest retirement age to 70. In all
cases, we predict sharp increases in average annual hours of work (with estimates varying
between 16 and 52 percent) and in full-time employment at ages 62 to 69. For couples most of
this is due to a reduction in non-employment, while for singles it is primarily due to a shift from
part-time into full-time employment. Again, we find smaller changes in the labor supply of wives
compared to that of husbands, and somewhat smaller (although still substantial) increases for
single women compared to single men. The policy changes have very little effect on the labor
supply of married individuals at ages below 62, but this is not the case for singles for whom we
predict varying positive and negative responses in labor supply that depend on the exact nature of
the policy change.  For example, removal of the work disincentives embedded in the earnings test
leads to a 6.6 ( 2.6) percent increase in annual hours of work for single males (females) at ages
51-61, but has a negligible impact on the labor supply of married couples in that age group.
Overall, the counterfactual experiments indicate that the changes in the social security
rules we consider would lead to large behavioral responses in the work behavior of low income48
households, which in turn would have a substantial financial impact on the social security
system. At the same time, we found the employment responses to these policy changes to be
accompanied by modest, but not inconsequential, changes in net assets holding, indicating that
both labor supply and savings decisions play important roles in mitigating the consequences for
consumption and welfare of benefit reductions and of the elimination or postponement of the
early and normal retirement age . 49
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C.F. Manski” in Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,1999.Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics of Initial State Variables – Estimation Sample
Single Married
Male Female Male Female
Mean Age:
Unweighted 56.2 55.9 59.4 55.2
(3.3) (3.2) (5.9) (4.5)
a
Weighted 56.2 55.8 59.5 55.4
% Black:
Unweighted 37.8 43.3 18.9 18.5
Weighted 23.4 28.7 11.5 11.4
% Hispanic:
Unweighted 13.5 15.7 19.3 18.1
Weighted 12.4 12.4 13.3 12.3
Mean Highest Grade Completed:
Unweighted 10.7 10.4 10.3 10.4
(3.8) (3.5) (4.2) (3.6)
Weighted 11.0 10.7 10.9 10.8
% Ever had a DB Pension Job:
Unweighted 34.0 17.3 50.0 23.5
Weighted 37.1 17.4 54.3 24.7
Current Pension Income (household):
Unweighted 1,615 480 4,055 4,055
(4,642) (2,603) (7,010) (7,010
Weighted 2,080 437 4,601 776
Mean Work Experience (total hours):
Unweighted 57,501 41,308 72,963 31,685
(28,545) (29,119) (21,583) (27,932)
Weighted 57,422 41,768 72,971 31,302
Mean Current Job Tenure (hours):
Unweighted 8,834 10,225 13,873 8,076
(16,904) (16,723) (21,377) (13,590)
Weighted 10,330 9,353 13,380 7,539
Mean Net Assets (no imputations):
Unweighted 30,067 17,452 114,900
(91,944) (46,098) (398,056)
Weighted 34,639 24,084 126,874 Table 1: cont.
Single Married
Male Female Male Female
Median Net Assets (no imputations):
Unweighted 500 0 30,500
Weighted 750 35 41,500
Mean Net Assets (imputations):
Unweighted 46,070 30,133 118,853
(111,371) (65,116) (286,133)
Weighted 57,098 39,345 132,327
Median Net Assets (imputations):
Unweighted 1,850 1,000 48,000
Weighted 5,150 1,500 56,700
Mean Number of Covered Quarters:
Unweighted 93.2 62.2 107.6 55.1
(40.2) (43.7) (45.7) (39.4)
Weighted 95.1 63.2 110.6 55.8
Mean AIME:
Unweighted 931 499 1,276 390
(741) (528) (864) (418)
Weighted 1,025 504 1,363 402
% Poor Health:
Unweighted 51.7 48.2 33.7 32.2
Weighted 47.2 45.3 30.7 29.4
% With Employer Health Insurance:
Unweighted 16.9 21.4 18.2 11.4
Weighted 20.9 23.6 18.4 11.6
% With Employer Health Insurance 
when Retired:
Unweighted 7.0 10.1 12.1   6.5
Weighted 8.6 11.9 12.5  6.8
% Never Married:
Unweighted 27.4 19.8 0.0 0.0
Weighted 29.5 17.4 0.0 0.0Table 1: cont.
Single Married
Male Female Male Female
% Chance Work Full-Time at Age 62:
Unweighted 55.1 53.9 57.1 42.8
(41.0) (39.6) (39.6) (38.6)
Weighted 54.3 54.2 57.4 40.5
% Chance Live to Age 75:
Unweighted 51.5 58.8 60.7 61.1
(35.2) (35.0) (33.1) (30.3)
Weighted 50.4 58.3 60.6 61.3
% Chance Live to Age 85:
Unweighted 31.9 44.2 40.4 43.0
(34.2) (37.3) (33.7) (32.6)
Weighted 31.3 43.2 39.8 42.0
% Chance Leave a Bequest of $10,000:
Unweighted 36.3 31.5 55.0 49.0
(44.0) (42.2) (43.7) (43.4)
Weighted 38.9 35.2 56.6 52.7
% Chance Leave a Bequest of $100,000:
Unweighted 11.6 10.8 25.8 21.1
(27.6) (10.8) (38.0) (35.7)
Weighted 14.2 13.5 28.5 24.0
Expected Social Security Benefits:
Unweighted 580 573 691 453
(237) (294) (294) (228)
Weighted 573 576 704 463
Number of Observations 230 363 525 525
a.     Standard deviation in parentheses.Table 2
Actual and Predicted Non-Employment Rates by Marital Status,
Gender and Age (unweighted (u) and weighted (w) samples)
               Married Single
Male Female Male Female
NE (u) NE (w) NE (u) NE (w) NE (u) NE (w) NE (u) NE (w)




43.7  37.5   42.2 62.8
(1141)
69.0 63.2  70.1 61.9
(514)





51.0  53.1   51.7 69.6
(286)
64.2 69.1  65.5 79.1
(148)





57.2  60.6   58.2 72.7
(256)
72.5 71.5  73.4 81.1
(127)





62.5  66.1   64.1 81.1
(196)
80.9 79.2  81.1 78.2
(87)





70.3  70.6   71.4 85.3
(136)
86.0 82.3  86.6 78.7
(47)





75.8  75.9   77.2 80.2
(81)





74.1 75.1  75.5  80.6
(36)




81.7 80.4  81.8 85.7
(21)
80.7  80.1  78.6 * - * - * - * -
a. Number of person-period observations in parentheses
 
 *  Indicates less than 25 observationsTable 3
Actual and Predicted Full- and Part-Time Employment Rates
by Marital Status, Gender and Age (weighted)
               Married Single
Male Female Male Female
FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT
Age Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred.
50-59   54.3  50.0   8.2   7.9 23.5 23.9 13.4   6.0 30.2 33.0 9.7    9.1 36.9 33.9 12.0 16.8
60-61  37.1  40.4   9.8   7.8 16.4 21.5 14.5  13.0 17.4 20.1 4.2   10.0 25.5 29.1   7.9 14.1
61-62  28.5  34.6  10.8   7.7 14.5 16.8 13.9   9.8 13.7 14.2 6.0    9.7 19.1 22.6   9.4 14.6
62-63  22.0  25.8 11.9  10.0   9.3 10.8 11.5   8.0 16.3 11.3 6.0  10.5 14.2 16.9 10.1 13.6
63-64   16.2  17.7 13.1  10.8   6.9  9.4 10.8   4.0 22.5  9.0 1.3  14.5 18.0 14.2   8.3 15.2
64-65  11.4  13.1 12.7    9.7  10.7   8.6 11.6   3.6 * - *  - 18.4   9.2   7.6 21.0
65-66  12.5  13.0 12.4   11.5 15.4 11.8  6.8   4.7 * - * - * - * -
66+    7.8   8.9 11.8    9.3  19.9  18.4  0.0   3.0 * - * - * - * -
 
* Indicates less than 25 observationsTable  4
Actual and Predicted Accepted Wages for Full- and Part-Time Work 
by Marital Status and Gender (weighted)
Full-Time Part-Time
 Mean Median  S. D.  Mean  Median  S. D.
Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred.
Married
   Male 10.86
 
11.73   9.21
 
10.04   9.45 7.34 8.45  9.81 6.63 8.05 5.52 6.57
   Female   7.79
 
  7.78   6.76   6.60   6.82 5.15 6.68  6.35 5.83 5.27 3.45 4.37
Single   
    Male   8.64
 
 8.94    7.60
 
  7.80   4.62 5.14 8.42  7.74 6.63 6.92 5.90 4.24
    Female   8.44
  
  9.40   7.75    8.09   4.32 5.69 8.82  7.64 6.07 6.43 9.63 4.84
 Table 5
Actual and Predicted Net Assets by Marital Status and Gender (weighted)
Married Single
 Male 
Actual       Predicted
Female 
   Actual          Predicted
Male
     Actual             Predicted
Female
     Actual            Predicted
Mean 125,432 120,062 125,432 120,062  44,491 36,674 32,876 25,252
Std. Dev. 202,251 196,032 202,251 196,032 106,317 90,092 68,659 65,052
10 Percentile 100 -1785 100 -1785 -2,200 -5,713 -68 -5,811
th 
50 Percentile   56,500 57,828   56,500 57,828    1,650  1,732 600 -1,595
th 
90 Percentile 322,000 303,145 322,000 303,145 153,000 116,284 123,000 93,502
th 
Mean
      Age 50-59
      Age 60-65

























Actual and Predicted One-Period Employment Transitions
by Marital Status and Gender (weighted)
                            Married Male 











Actual 95.5   3.1   1.4 97.8   1.1   1.1 96.6   2.2   1.2 96.5   1.9   1.6
Predicted 92.0   2.1   5.9 91.5   2.8   5.7 93.8   2.0   4.1 90.7   3.7   5.7
Employed Part
 -Time (PT)
Actual 27.1 64.6   8.4 20.8 64.3 14.9 46.1 45.4   8.6 14.2 66.5 19.3
Predicted 25.0 56.7 18.2 26.2 38.3 35.6 14.1 64.3 21.6 9.3 59.3 31.4
Employed Full
  -Time (FT)
Actual   2.7   6.8 90.5   3.9   9.1 87.1   4.3   10.4 85.3  4.3   7.2 88.4
Predicted 16.8   6.2 77.0 20.0 10.8 69.2 15.6    10.3 74.1 11.0 11.7 77.3Table 7
Actual and Predicted Expectations Variables (weighted)
   Married Male   Married Female Single Male Single Female
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Percent Chance
  Work at Age 62 38.8 27.3 24.8 41.6 35.8 26.7 40.1 40.0
Percent Chance Be
Alive at Age 75
59.3 64.6 59.3 64.3 52.8 60.0 60.0 63.1
Percent Chance Be
Alive at Age 75
39.8 33.5 40.1 35.6 33.9 29.3 43.2 33.8
Leave a Bequest of 
  $10,000                 
                                
55.8 69.6 52.9 68.6 38.7 51.8 35.2
43.5
  $100,000 28.2 39.3 24.0 38.0 13.6 23.6 13.3 17.2
Expected Social  
Security Amount 720 712 545 379 624 524 659 350Table 8
Actual and Predicted Joint Husband and Wife Employment 
By Age of Husband, Age of Wife 50-59 (weighted)
Neither Works Only Husband Works Only Wife Works Both Work
  
Actual       Predicted
 





24.6 27.8 31.4 49.7 13.7 11.6 30.3 11.0
60-61
(165)
44.1 36.1 28.8 38.7 13.4 12.3 13.8 12.9
61-62
(161)
55.0 43.0 18.9 33.2 14.3 14.8 11.8 9.0
62-63
(148)
61.4 47.0  8.7 28.6 19.5 17.8 10.4 6.6
63-64
(111)
60.2 50.5  9.3 28.4 18.5 16.6 12.0 4.5
64-65
(83)
58.7 59.7 7.5 21.6 20.8 14.4 13.0 4.3
65-66
(76)
55.9 62.2 2.7 19.5 31.3 14.7 10.3 3.7
66+
(185)
68.2 64.4 4.1 16.0 18.9 16.7  8.9 2.8
a. Number of Observations in ParenthesesTable 9
Actual and Predicted Labor Supply by Selected Characteristics (weighted)
Married Male Married Female
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
NE PT FT NE PT FT NE PT FT NE PT FT
Receiving DB
Pension Income
Yes 81.5   9.8   8.7 74.2   7.5 18.3 72.6 16.5 10.9 75.3   8.9 15.8
No 44.4 10.3 45.3 50.7   8.7 40.6 61.7 10.2 28.1 66.2   7.2 26.6
Health Status Poor
Yes 72.8   7.7 19.5 69.8   6.8 23.5 78.6   9.6 11.8 74.7   7.3 18.0
No 47.1 11.8 41.1 51.1   9.9 39.0 58.1 15.0 27.0 69.1   9.3 21.7
High School Dropout
Yes 53.6 10.9 35.5 59.7   7.1 33.2 71.1 11.3 17.7 70.3   6.6 23.2
No 59.3   9.6 31.1 58.4   9.8 31.9 61.2 14.2 24.7 73.0   8.0 19.1Table 9 continued 
Single Male Single Female
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
NE PT FT NE PT FT NE PT FT NE PT FT
Receiving DB
Pension Income
Yes 81.6   9.2   9.3 73.9   7.5 18.6 69.8   4.8 25.4 56.9 19.3 23.9
No 59.7   6.7 33.7 57.3 11.3 31.4 51.5 12.9 35.6 49.4 17.4 33.2
Health Status Poor
Yes 78.5  10.7 10.7 76.3   5.0 18.7 83.0   5.6 11.4 69.7 13.3 17.0
No 48.1   6.1 45.9 46.2 15.0 38.8 31.8 15.9 52.3 38.4 21.1 40.6
High School Dropout
Yes 71.1   6.2 22.8 73.3    6.7 20.0 77.8   7.6 14.7 70.1 11.0 18.9
No 62.0   9.2 29.8 55.3  12.3 32.4 38.4 14.1 47.5 38.3 20.6 41.1Table 10
Selected Characteristics by Type- Singles
Females Males
Type 1 Type 2 Type 1 Type 2
Proportion .582 .418 .987 .013
Highest Grade 10.7 10.8 11.0 10.9
   Completed
Not Working .791 .154 .607 .686
Work Full Time .151 .567 .284 .291
Annual Earnings 3,837 11,455 5,729 8,258
Net Worth 20,383 26,038 38,346 38,062
Consumption 6,872 9,351 9,110 9,442Table 11
Selected Characteristics by Type – Married Couples
(Both Age 51-61)
  Type 1 Husb.      Type 1 Husb.  Type 2 Husb.  Type 2 Husb.
  Type 1 Wife  Type 2 Wife   Type 1 Wife   Type 2 Wife
Proportion .060 .012 .746 .182
Highest Grade 
  Completed
     Husband 11.7 11.2 11.2 10.9
     Wife 11.5 11.1 11.0 10.7
Not Working
     Husband .327 .462 .297 .601
     Wife .854 .214 .935 .275
     Both .288 .108 .277 .165
Work Full Time
     Husband .515 .283 .653 .370
     Wife .120 .706 .051 .647
     Both .055 .200 .028 .237
Annual Earnings
     Husband   9,260  6,876 16,100 10,512
     Wife   2,331 10,458 1,047 9,262
     Total 11,591 17,334 17,147 19,774
Net Worth 110,534 89,029 92,000 77,075
Consumption
     Husband 8,586 13,823 7,817 12,571
     Wife 8,642 2,819 9,246 3,049
     Total 17,228 16,642 17,062 15,623Table 12
The Effect of Counterfactual Changes in Social Security For Married Couples Both Age 51-61 in 1992
No Private Pensions
Benefit Reduction Payroll Tax No Earnings Tax No Benefits No Benefits
Baseline 25% 50% Increase to 15% Until Age 65 Until Age 70
Age Age Age Age Age Age Age
a
51-61 62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61   62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61  62-69
Percent
   NE H
b 27.0 48.7 28.5 45.0 28.6 39.5 31.7 55.5 26.5 43.9 25.7 38.6 25.7 32.3
W 75.9 84.2 76.6 83.0 77.3 81.8 76.2 84.9 75.9 82.3 76.5 83.8 76.5 82.6
   FT H 68.3 37.8 67.1 45.2 67.0 52.3 64.0 30.3 68.7 47.0 69.9 47.3 69.9 58.1
W 20.7 12.3 19.9 14.1 19.2 16.1 20.1 11.6 20.8 15.8 20.2 15.4 20.2 16.6
   PT H 4.7 13.6 4.4 9.8 4.4 8.3 4.4 14.2 4.8 9.0 4.4 14.1 4.4 9.6
W 3.4 3.6 3.5 2.6 3.5 2.2 3.7 3.5 3.3 1.9 3.3 0.8 3.3 0.8
Annual Hours  
  
H 1,470 927 1,441 1,043 1,439 1,173 1,376 778 1,479 1,072 1,500 1,131 1,500 1,308
W 466 292 451 326 436 356 457 278 467 348 455 328 455 353
Consumption H 8,007 10,035 7,774 9,743 7,724 9,151 7,346 9,298 8,258 11,072 7,945 10,154 7,945 9,391
W 6,763 7,622 6,582 7,206 6,545 7,020 6,224 6,991 6,983 8,465 6,725 7,802 6,725 6,971
Earnings H 15,630 9,372 15,363 10,545 15,422 11,969 14,664 7,899 15,732 10,957 15,968 11,321 15,968 13,218
W 3,242 1,819 3,126 2,078 3,024 2,293 3,180 1,709 3,261 2,419 3,147 2,153 3,147 2,371
Social Security H - 525 - 376 - 240 - 541 - 647 - 473 - -
Ben. (monthly) W - 292 - 212 - 137 - 295 - 327 - 197 - -
Social Security  H - 88.4 - 87.3 - 86.2 - 89.8 - 99.4 - 65.7 - -
Take-Up Rate W - 91.6 - 91.1 - 90.0 - 92.9 - 99.4 - 50.0 - -
Net Assets 69,752 121,355 69,884 118,726 70,021 117,559 66,290 112,189 68,496 131,191 70,593 117,624 70,593 102,787
a.  Mean ages of husbands and wives are 57.6 and 56.9 in first age range and 65.8 and 64.9 in second age range
b.  H=Husband, W=WifeTable 13
The Effect of Counterfactual Changes in Social Security For Single Males
No Private Pensions
Benefit Reduction Payroll Tax No Earnings Tax No Benefits No Benefits
Baseline 25% 50% Increase to 15% Until Age 65 Until Age 70
Age Age Age Age Age Age Age
51-61 62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61   62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61  62-69
Percent
   NE 57.1 58.0 60.2 58.2 63.2 60.1 64.3 69.4 54.3 53.7 55.8 53.6 61.9 57.2
   FT 32.7 10.3 30.1 14.8 28.2 25.2 26.8 6.4 34.8 31.9 34.7 33.4 29.1 33.6
   PT 10.2 31.7 9.7 26.9 8.7 14.7  8.9 24.2 10.9 14.4 9.6 13.0 9.0 9.1
Annual Hours  
  
785 543 728     588    676     677    649      384 837 814 821 830 700 795
Consumption 7,146 7,420 6,875 6,996 6,645  6,756  6,683    6,868 7,350 8,078 7,128 7,635 6,884 6,910
Earnings 6,487 4,253 6,105   4,670 5,757  5,511  5,523    3,126 6,817 6,448 6.790 6,717 5,960 6,617
Social Security - 441      -    320     -     200      -       443 - 471 - 299 - -
Ben. (monthly)
Social Security  - 87.6 -     87.0      -     86.3      -      88.4 - 92.4 - 54.1 - -
Take Up Rate
Net Assets 17,993 31,842 18,409 30,593 18,599 30,844 16,281   26,588 17,525 38,995 18,704 33,612 17,748 26,612Table 14
The Effect of Counterfactual Changes in Social Security For Single Females
No Private Pensions
Benefit Reduction Payroll Tax No Earnings Tax No Benefits No Benefits
Baseline 25% 50% Increase to 15% Until Age 65 Until Age 70
Age Age Age Age Age Age Age
51-61 62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61   62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61 62-69 51-61  62-69
Percent
   NE 46.3 53.1 48.7 52.6 50.6 52.4 50.2 56.6 45.3 48.7 46.7 50.8 51.1 49.1
   FT 40.3 24.0 37.5 29.2 35.3 34.3 35.6 17.2 41.7 40.1 39.6 36.9 34.7 42.0
   PT 13.3 22.9 13.9 18.2 14.1 13.3 14.2 26.2 12.9 11.2 13.8 12.3 14.3 8.9
Annual Hours  
   977 737 923 797 881 852 888 631 1002 950 966 896 870 966
Consumption 7,866 7,873 7,648 7,526 7,456 7,335 7,404 7,362 8,004 8,602 7,792 8,048 7,533 7,360
Earnings 8,254 6,366 7,826 6,962 7,509 7,497 7,534 5,419 8,463 8,332 8,197 7,794 7,440 8,585
Social Security - 264 -  186 - 116 - 227 - 320 - 197 - -
Ben. (monthly)
Social Security  - 67.3 - 66.2 - 65.5 - 69.0 - 77.8 - 45.5 - -
Take Up Rate
Net Assets 24,435 38,133 24,169 38,011 24,196 38,273 22,123 31,738 24,092 45,781 24,455 39,187 23,637 35,754                                                                   Table A.1
Utility function:




Health Insurance Offer Function:Type Probability Function:
Net Asset Constraint:Table A.2
Parameter Estimates
     Utility Function                     Pareto Weights                        Wage Function
Estimate (S.E.) Estimate (S.E.) Estimate 
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5.72E-03 (2.40E-05)    
6.33E-05 (2.00E-06)
0.064 (3.70E-05)
-0.068 (1.09E-04)Table A.2, continued
       Survival Hazard Function                        Health Transition Function                     Health Insurance Offer Rate
                                                                                            (to good health)



















22 2 B .079 (1.60E-05) B 5.94E-03 (6.00E-06) B -.050 (3.83E-03)
sh h i
33 3 B -1.84 (1.86E-03) B -2.54 (7.58E-04) B 1.01 (1.09E-04)
sh h i
44 B -1.53E-03 (3.80E-04) B -0.652 (2.76E-04)
sh
55 B 1.86E-03 (6.94E-04) B 0.919 (1.38E-03)
sh
66 B 1.90E-03 (5.45E-04) B 0.015 (1.28E-03)
sh
77 B -1.87E-03 (6.00E-06) B -3.05E-03(2.00E-06)
sh
88 B 2.73E-05 (5.71E-04) B 0.384 (4.00E-04)
sh
       
       Type Probability Function                             Net Asset Lower Bound                  Error Standard Deviations 

















2c B 1.85E-07 (8.40E-05) W -25.0 (.112)
p
Current job
    , 0.248 (2.30E-04)
w
3m B -4.021 (.202) > 4.15E-03 (4.00E-06)
p
New job
    , 0.251 (2.28E-04)
c
4f B 0.116 (9.03E-04) > 4.13E-03 (2.20E-05)
p
5 B 1.44E-03 (.022)
p
6 B 0.010 (5.16E-04)
p
7 B 0.513 (6.64E-03)
p
8 B -5.86 (.203)
pTable A.2, continued
                Measurement Error                                      Miscellaneous                                           Fixed
























1 R 0.713 (3.55E-04)
a. H,T measured in units of 520 hoursTable B.1
Actual and Predicted Full- and Part-Time Employment Rates
by Marital Status, Gender and Age (unweighted)
               Married Single
Male Female Male Female
FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT
Age Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred.
50-59 52.9 48.4   8.7   7.9 24.5 25.1 12.7   5.9 29.2 30.2 8.9    9.1 33.7 32.4 12.2 15.6
60-61 40.5 41.1   7.8   7.9 16.8 22.8 13.6 13.0 16.9 19.1 4.1  10.4 23.3 26.9 7.3 13.7
61-62 31.5 35.5   8.6   7.3 14.1 17.6 13.3   9.9 13.4 14.1 5.5  10.3 18.7 22.0  8.1 14.5
62-63 23.3 28.1 10.2   9.4   8.7 11.3 10.2   7.8 16.1  9.9 5.7  11.4 14.7 16.7  8.4 13.5
63-64 17.4 19.6 11.3  10.1   5.9  9.9  8.8   4.1 19.1  7.6 2.1  13.3 16.3 14.4  7.0 14.6
64-65 12.8 14.8 11.7  9.4   8.6   8.8 11.1   4.0 *  - *  - 15.2 11.0  6.1 20.9
65-66 12.4 15.2 12.4  10.7 11.1  10.7  8.3   4.6 * - *   - *   -  * -
66  7.5  9.2 12.0   9.0 14.3  15.6  0.0   3.7 * - * - * - * -
+
 
 *  Indicates less than 25 observationsTable  B.2
Actual and Predicted Accepted Wages for Full- and Part-Time Work 
by Marital Status and Gender (unweighted)
Full-Time Part-Time
 Mean Median  S. D.  Mean  Median  S. D.
Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred.
Married





9.72 7.93 7.09 8.38 9.48 6.58. 7.82 5.39 6.29
   Female   7.39
 (402)
  7.64 6.52
(226)
6.43 6.23 5.14 6.47 6.21 5.75 5.08 3.16 4.38
Single   




7.68 4.49 5.11 8.20 7.66 6.47 6.77 5.96 4.33
    Female   8.44
  (352)
  9.12 7.46
(130)
7.82 4.77 5.62 8.28 7.37 5.96 6.18 8.78 7.37
a. No. of observations in parentheses
 Table B.3
Actual and Predicted Net Assets by Marital Status and Gender (unweighted)
Married Single
 Male 
Actual       Predicted
Female 
   Actual          Predicted
Male
     Actual             Predicted
Female
     Actual            Predicted
Mean 107,916
(576)





Std. Dev. 186,114 257,806 186,114 256,785 87,992 79,500 55,443 53,407
10 Percentile 0 -2,250 0 -2,285 0 -5.839 0 -5,854
th 
50 Percentile 46,280 56,383 46,280 56,312 1,000 -1,120 13 -3,609
th 
90 Percentile 305,000 307,297 305,000 306,286 102,000 86,112 80,200 66,130
th 
Mean
      Age 50-59
      Age 60-65


































Actual and Predicted One-Period Employment Transitions
by Marital Status and Gender (unweighted)
                            Married Male (1267)
a 











Actual 96.2   2.6   1.3 97.9   1.1   1.0 97.2   1.7   1.1 96.7   2.0   1.3
Predicted 92.0   1.9   6.2 91.3   2.7   6.0 94.4   1.7   3.9 91.1   3.6   5.3
Employed Part
 -Time (PT)
Actual 28.2 62.9   8.9 21.4 63.6 15.0 34.2 56.1   9.8 17.5 66.0 16.5
Predicted 22.7 57.2 20.2 25.6 38.3 36.1 15.3 64.5 20.2 9.8 58.2 32.0
Employed Full
  -Time (FT)
Actual   2.7   6.9 90.4   3.9   9.4 86.8   4.8   7.6 87.6   4.4   7.8 87.8
Predicted 16.0   5.9 78.1 19.0 10.5 70.5 16.1  10.8 73.2 11.9 11.0 77.1
a. No. of observations in parentheses
 Table B.5
Actual and Predicted Expectations Variables (unweighted)
   Married Male   Married Female Single Male Single Female
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
Percent Chance
  Work at Age 62 39.6 27.6 26.5 41.7 34.7 25.4 37.8 39.1
Be Alive at Age 75 60.1 63.9 59.0 63.7 52.9 58.8 59.9 62.2
Leave a Bequest of 
  $10,000                 
                                
54.3 67.2 49.2 66.3 35.7 45.4 31.6 39.7
  $100,000 25.6 36.4 21.4 35.2 11.1 20.1 10.7 14.6
Expected Social  
Security Amount    
                      
701 685 535 375 645 506 642 344Table B.6
Actual and Predicted Labor Supply by Selected Characteristics (unweighted)
Married Male Married Female
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
NE PT FT NE PT FT NE PT FT NE PT FT
Receiving DB
Pension Income
Yes 81.3   9.5   9.2 74.3   9.3 16.5 73.6 14.8 11.6 58.8 13.8 27.4
No 45.5   9.8 44.7 53.6 12.0 34.4 61.8 10.2 28.0 54.2   9.1 36.6
Health Status Poor
Yes 71.7   7.5 20.9 71.6   7.8 20.6 77.7   8.6 13.6 61.7 10.8 27.4
No 46.2 11.6 42.2 51.6 12.6 35.1 56.9 14.8 28.4 56.5 12.8 30.7
High School Dropout
Yes 54.3 10.1 35.7 62.1   9.7 28.2 69.5 11.0 19.6 58.9 11.8 29.7
No 59.0   9.5 31.5 58.7 12.4 28.9 61.2 13.6 25.2 57.4   9.2 33.5Table B.6 continued 
Single Male Single Female
Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
NE PT FT NE PT FT NE PT FT NE PT FT
Receiving DB
Pension Income
Yes 84.8   6.5   8.7 79.8   4.6 15.6 73.1   3.9 23.1 47.4 24.6 28.0
No 61.6   6.8 31.6 63.3   8.1 28.7 54.3 13.2 32.6 47.8 18.6 33.6
Health Status Poor
Yes 79.5   8.5 12.0 78.1   5.1 16.9 82.8   6.4 10.9 66.5 14.8 18.7
No 47.7   6.8 45.5 50.3 10.4 39.3 35.6 14.5 49.8 38.1 22.3 39.6
High School Dropout
Yes 70.7   6.0 23.3 76.3   5.7 18.0 77.1   8.1 14.9 66.4 12.9 20.8
No 64.5   8.6 26.9 59.8   8.1 32.2 41.5 13.7 44.8 36.1 22.1 41.8Table C.1
Actual and Predicted Non-Employment Rates by Marital Status,
Gender and Age (unweighted (u) and weighted (w) samples):
No Private Pensions
               Married Single
Male Female Male Female
NE (u) NE (w) NE (u) NE (w) NE (u) NE (w) NE (u) NE (w)




41.4  29.2   38.3 52.0
(706)
66.1 53.0  67.5 57.4
(333)





41.9  38.1   42.0 61.8
(173)
61.7 61.6  63.3 72.4
(87)





50.4  43.9   51.7 67.1
(152)
69.7 65.6  71.2 73.0
(74)





60.2  56.6   62.0 76.6
(11)
78.4 74.0  78.3 67.3
(52)





61.6  61.5   63.3 81.3
(75)
83.4 78.5  83.5 65.5
(29)





57.5  55.7   59.6 74.5
(47)
86.3 72.3  86.8 * - *  - * - * -
65-66 50.9
(55)




75.2 70.7  74.4 * - 100.0  90.1 * - * - * - * -
a. Number of person-period observations in parentheses
 
 *  Indicates less than 25 observationsTable C.2
Actual and Predicted Full- and Part-Time Employment Rates
by Marital Status, Gender and Age (weighted):
No Private Pensions
               Married Single
Male Female Male Female
FT PT FT PT FT PT FT PT
Age Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred.
50-59   63.1  55.0   7.7   6.7 29.0 26.6 18.0   5.9 35.4 35.8 8.5    9.3 40.0 36.3 14.0 17.7
60-61  51.0  50.6  10.9   7.4 22.1 24.0 16.3  12.7 29.2 29.0 0.7   10.4 32.6 34.0  10.7 15.9
61-62  42.7  42.0  13.4   6.2 18.6 18.7 15.8  10.0 25.6 23.1 2.3   11.0 24.9 26.8  12.2 16.9
62-63  32.0  29.5 11.4  8.5  11.6 12.3 14.4   9.4 30.2 18.5 3.4  15.7 19.3 20.8 12.4 15.3
63-64   26.1  24.1 12.4 12.7  10.6  11.1 10.9   5.4 39.6 15.4 2.2  24.6 22.4 17.5   8.8 16.6
64-65  25.3  25.0 18.9 15.4  15.7   8.2 12.0   5.0 * - *  - *   -   * -
65-66  14.1  25.2 26.3   17.8 * -  *   - * - * - * - * -
66+    7.7 13.5 15.2  12.1  *  -  *   - * - * - * - * -Table  C.3
Actual and Predicted Accepted Wages for Full- and Part-Time Work 
by Marital Status and Gender (weighted):
No Private Pensions
Full-Time Part-Time
 Mean Median  S. D.  Mean  Median  S. D.
Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred. Act. Pred.
Married
   Male 9.62
 
10.93   7.93
 
9.38   6.19 6.82 7.46  9.14 6.36 7.26 4.70 6.49
   Female   7.55
 
  8.16   6.50   6.99   7.45 5.29 6.56  6.57 5.68 5.47 3.64 4.30
Single   
    Male  8.42
 
 8.89    7.55
 
  7.67   4.40 5.26 7.26  7.70 6.51 6.93 3.19 4.01
    Female   8.20
  
  9.51   7.65    8.16   4.33 5.74 8.21  7.77 5.83 6.57 5.75 4.81Table C.4




Actual       Predicted
Female 
   Actual          Predicted
Male
     Actual             Predicted
Female
     Actual            Predicted
Mean 73,061 82,245 73,061 82,245  24,571 22,928 32,206 24,376
Std. Dev. 166,447 164,732 166,447 164,732 77,101 58,301 72,619 68,799
10 Percentile     -140 -4,292     -140 -4,292 -2,200 -5,841   -500 -5,842
th 
50 Percentile   28,500 40,397   28,500 40,397    1,000    -162     500 -1,526
th 
90 Percentile 198,400 195,287 198,400 195,287 63,600 77,250 111,082 77,777
th 
Mean
      Age 50-59
      Age 60-65

























The Effect of Counterfactual Changes in Social Security on Labor Supply
Ages 55-58, 59-61, 62-64, 65-69
Baseline Benefits Reduction            Payroll Tax           No Earnings           No Benefits     No Benefits
25% 50% Increase 15% Tax          Until Age 65         Until Age 70
Annual Hours
   Married Couples
      Age 55-58
            Husband 1,344 1,314 1,314 1,249 1,363 1,392 1,314
            Wife 482 462 450    474    480   465    450
       Age 59-61
            Husband 1,349  1,351 1,419 1,224 1,412  1,513 1,513
            Wife 519 508 497    517 527 514    514
        Age 62-64
            Husband 1,204 1,274 1,363 1,078 1,343 1,461 1,460
            Wife 341 381 406 332 392 463    459
        Age 65-69
           Husband 655 808 969 485 813 794   1,140
           Wife 254 286 323 243 307 219 268
   Single Males
        Age 55-58 816 754 693 685 856 824 698
                59-61 807 753 711 658 881 889 762
                62-64 585 608 679 453 867 954 797
                65-69 515 575 676 338 778 747 793
   Single Females
         Age 55-58 991 927 880 896 1,012 965 859
                 59-61 1,006 957 917 913 1,043  1,018 917
                 62-64 804 845 889 682 1,012  1,047 956
                 65-69 692 764 828 597 909 795 973